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 Abstract 
 
   
  The role of cultural diversity in various aspects of society has been theoretically 
and empirically investigated.  Prevailing measures of cultural diversity mainly 
focus on diversity of ethnicity, religion and language. However, there has been 
little discussion about diversity in human values. We construct cultural diversity 
measures based on human values and seek to examine its role in economic 
development. This thesis demonstrates the significance our measure plays in 
estimating the impact of formal institutions (rule of law) and informal institutions 
(respect for others) on economic performance. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation    
 
  In recent years, there has been increasing interest in the role of cultural 
diversity in many aspects of society. The impact of cultural diversity has been 
investigated from the viewpoint of economic growth (Easterly and Levine, 1997 
and Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005), trust (Zak and Knack, 2001), government 
performance (Alesina et al. 2003 and La porta et al., 1999), social stability (Nettle 
et al., 2007), democratization (Akdede, 2010), and many other perspectives. The 
role of cultural diversity has been researched from language, ethnic, and religious 
affiliations. However, there are some drawbacks in these indices. Many 
researchers point out problems caused by lack of a uniform criterion to define 
these affiliations. This is because group identities are complex. To make matters 
worse, as globalization advances, it becomes difficult for some people to clarify 
their own ethnicity, religion or language. A person who brought up with more than 
one language finds it difficult to identify her native language. Further, widely used 
cultural diversity measure assumes that sum of the population shares of the 
cultural groups in a society is 100 percent. However, when it comes to religion, 
the CIA World Fact Book shows that 83.9 percent of Japanese are classified as 
Shintoism, 71.4 percent as Buddhism, 2 percent as Christianity, and 7.8 percent 
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as others. It is apparent that the sum exceeds 100 percent. Therefore, this thesis 
aims to address these problems and construct a new cultural diversity measure 
based on human values.  
  The role of cultural diversity has been discussed by many researchers from the 
aspect of “external traits” such as ethnicity, religion and language. Contrary to 
previous studies, we aim to investigate the role of diversity in “internal traits” 
such as human values. There has been little discussion on the role of diversity in 
“internal traits” so that this study proposes a new aspect of cultural diversity. We 
call this measure “value diversity”. Commonly used measures are created using 
ethnic, religious, or language groups. People speaking English are grouped in one 
group. This thesis follows this way and makes groups that share similar values. In 
contrast to ethnicity, language, and religion there are no pre-determined 
groupings for human values. Therefore, in order to group individuals, we create 
“value type”. Individuals who made similar responses in survey questions are 
classified into the same value type. Simple way to group individuals is to select 
one dichotomous question from the World Values Survey (WVS) 1  and classify 
individuals into two value types. However, this way captures only one aspect of 
human values so that we introduce existing frameworks of cultural dimensions. 
Cross-cultural research identifies sets of cultural values useful in describing 
cultures. This study introduces two well-known value theories- Inglehart value 
theory (dimensions) and Schwartz value theory (dimensions)2.   
  Firstly, we consider Inglehart’s approach to human values. In Inglehart (1997) 
and Inglehart and Welzel (2005), two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation 
are shown. First dimension is traditional versus secular-rational values. Traditional 
values emphasize the followings. (1) God is important in respondent’s life, (2) 
                                                   
1 WVS provides a cross-cultural measure of peoples’ values 
2 There are many other studies that investigate cultural dimensions. For 
instance, Hofstede (2001) has developed so-called Hofstede’s dimensions; 
Individualism vs collectivism; uncertainty avoidance; power distance and 
masculinity vs femininity.  
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importance of obedience and religious faith, (3) abortion is never justifiable, (4) 
national pride and (5) respect for authority. Secular-rational values have the 
opposite preferences on all of these topics. Second dimension is survival 
versus self-expression values. Survival values emphasize the followings. (6) 
Economic and physical security, (7) not very happy, (8) against a petition, (9) 
homosexuality is never justifiable and (10) careful about trusting people. Self-
expression values have the opposite preferences on all of these topics. These two 
dimensions explain more than 70 percent of the cross-national variations. 
Inglehart and Welzel (2010) located countries using above-mentioned dimensions 
(Figure 2.1). In order to create these two dimensions, ten items are used in their 
factor analysis. As WVS contains these 10 items, we use all the ten items in order 
to create value types and value diversity measure.  
  Schwartz (1992, 1999) developed a framework of human values. Ten values are 
identified by Schwartz. Ten values are the goals of power, achievement, hedonism, 
stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and 
security. WVS contains 10 questions called Schwartz items and each item 
corresponds to one of the ten Schwartz values. Therefore, we also construct value 
types and value diversity measure based on Schwartz items. 
  One of the objectives of our thesis is to construct value types and value diversity 
measures. In order to create these indices, this study uses data from WVS. The 
way of constructing these indicators are the followings. We first select questions 
from WVS that are used in a framework of Inglehart (Schwartz). Then, we classify 
individuals into groups using cluster analysis3. In doing so, individuals who made 
similar responses are grouped into the same value type. Therefore, individuals in 
the same value type share similar thoughts. As we come to know population shares 
of the value types in a country, we can calculate value diversity index. This 
                                                   
3 Cluster analysis is the way of grouping a set of individuals in such a way that respondents in the 
same group (value type) are more similar to each other than to those in other groups (value 
types). 
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approach enables us to ignore many factors that were obstacle in previous study 
and enables us to see only similarities and dissimilarities in values. In this thesis, 
we seek the role of value type and value diversity. Contribution of the thesis and 
outline of the thesis are discussed in the next section. 
 
    
1.2 Contribution and Outline of the Thesis        
 
  Researchers have been interested in the causes and impediments of economic 
growth. Institutions have been widely believed as an important determinant of 
economic development. According to North (1990, 3), “Institutions are the rules 
of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human 
exchange, whether political, social, or economic.” Further North (1990, 4) 
mentions that “Institutions include any form of constraints that human being 
devise to shape human interaction. Are institutions formal or informal? They can 
be either, and I am interested both in formal constraints- such as rules that human 
being devise-and informal constraints- such as conventions and codes of behavior.” 
The aim of this thesis is not to discuss details of the terms formal institutions and 
informal institutions. Therefore, this thesis follows papers that use institutional 
quality as formal institutions and culture as informal institutions.  
  A considerable amount of literature has been published on the advantages of 
different aspects of formal institutions, such as property rights, quality of 
government, legal systems. One of the most common indicators of formal 
institutions is an index of property rights, protection against expropriation risk 
that is used in Acemoglu et al. (2001). This measure is provided by Political Risk 
Services. The World Bank assembles institutional measures and creates six 
categories for the quality of institutions-Rule of Law, Control of Corruption, 
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Government Effectiveness, Political stability and Absence of Voice / Terrorism, 
Regulatory Quality, Voice and accountability. Recent papers such as Rodrik et al. 
(2004) and Acemoglu et al. (2014) use the rule of law index4 as an indicator for 
formal institutions.  Rule of law is defined as “Perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence (World Bank)” Acemoglu et al. (2014) 
states that the rule of law index captures “the most up-to date measure of broad 
institutions.” This thesis uses the rule of law index as a measure of institutions in 
chapter 3. 
  In addition to the research of formal institutions, scholars have also investigated 
the role of informal institutions such as culture (Tabellini, 2010, Zak and Knack, 
2001) in economic outcomes. One of the most studied informal institutions is 
generalized trust. Generalized trust is measured using the following question; 
 
 “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
need to be very careful in dealing with people? 
1 Most people can be trusted, 2 need to be very careful. 
 
This question is included in the World Values Survey (WVS), the General Social 
Survey (GSS), and the European Social Survey. Generalized trust is often measured 
by the fraction of individuals say “most people can be trusted”. Further, many 
researchers try to use different aspects of informal institutions such as 
individualism (Gorodnichenko, 2010., Gorodnichenko and Ronald, 2011), respect 
(Tabellini, 2010, Breuer and Mcdermott, 2013) and responsibility (Breuer and 
Mcdermott, 2013). Common way to measure informal institution is to aggregate 
individual responses collected in the WVS. In our fourth chapter, we focus on 
                                                   
4 from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
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specific values such as respect for others. 
  This thesis sheds lights on the use of hidden heterogeneity (value diversity) and 
share of value type by the study of the role of formal and informal institutions. It 
makes three contributions to the current literature. Firstly, in chapter 2, we 
discuss some shortcomings of prevailing measures of cultural diversity. Then, we 
construct and discuss the properties of new indices that are different from widely 
used indices. Using these indices, value type and value diversity, we make two 
additional contributions to the current literature. This thesis investigates the role 
of formal institutions (e.g. institutional quality) in economic performance in 
chapter 3. Finally, we see the impact of informal institutions (e.g. culture) on 
economic performance in chapter 4. To put it simply, chapters 3 and 4 investigate 
the effect of formal and informal institutions on economic performance using our 
measure created in chapter 2. In the following part, we list research questions 
and contributions of each chapter. 
 
 
 
1.2.1 Contribution and Overview of Chapter 2 
 
  As discussed in “Background and Motivation”, there has been no discussion on 
the role of diversity in “internal traits” such as human values so that this chapter 
proposes a new aspect of cultural diversity measure that grasps diversity in human 
values. This chapter first examines problems associated with the prevailing 
measures of cultural diversity. To mitigate the problems, we introduce several 
measures. To construct them, we use Schwartz's, and Inglehart's frameworks. 
Using WVS, this chapter constructs our measures “value type” and “value 
diversity”. This chapter uses one of the automatic classification methods, cluster 
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analysis, and classifies respondents into several groups based on their ten items 
from Inglehart and Baker (2010). Therefore, individuals who are grouped into the 
same value type share similar thoughts and values. As a result of cluster analysis, 
we come to know population shares of each value type. Therefore, we can 
calculate value diversity. For instance, we create 3 value types-value type 1, value 
type 2 and value type 3. People in each value type share similar values. Therefore, 
we can say that the situation is similar to commonly used affiliations. Instead of 
using Muslim, we use value type 1. In addition, this study uses the proportions of 
the populations that are identified as value type 1 instead of the proportions of 
the populations that are identified as Muslim. After the creation of value diversity, 
we see characteristics our new measure. As a result, we obtain interesting findings. 
As a measure of value diversity, the latter half of this chapter uses value 
fractionalization. Some striking examples demonstrate that the value 
fractionalization captures perspective that is different from prevailing cultural 
fractionalization measures. For instance, Argentina can be considered ethnically 
homogenous, religiously homogeneous and linguistically homogeneous. However, 
Argentina is heterogeneous with respect to human values. On another front, 
Tanzania is fragmented with respect to ethnicity, religion and language. However, 
Tanzania is homogeneous with regard to human values. Above-mentioned 
examples and other examples demonstrate that value fractionalization captures a 
new aspect of heterogeneity in a country. Further, the use of cultural diversity 
based on human values has a number of attractive features. One of those features 
is that it enables us to observe value fractionalization for people whose 
farther/mother is immigrant. Further, it becomes possible to observe value 
fractionalization for male/female. This chapter also finds that our value 
fractionalization measure is robust to changing grouping method. 
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In summary, this chapter aims: 
1 To review the role of cultural diversity in many aspects of society 
2 To identify problems associated with widely used measure of cultural diversity 
such as ethnic, religious and language diversity. 
3 To propose “value type” and “value diversity” using data from World Values 
Survey and to analyze the properties of our new indices 
 
 
1.2.2 Contribution and Overview of Chapter 3 
 
  In chapter 3, the thesis seeks the role of formal institutions measured by rule 
of law index in economic performance using value fractionalization. More 
specifically, we assess the robustness of results obtained in the seminal article 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (AJR) (2001) and many other papers by using 
value fractionalization. AJR (2001) hypothesizes that the mortality rates faced by 
Europeans had influence on their settlements and choice of colonization strategy. 
It is argued that Europeans tend to live in places that are relatively healthier and 
this behavior leads to institutions with high quality. This hypothesis leads to a 
strategy of using IV estimation. They use potential European settler mortality as 
an instrument for institutional variation in former European colonies today. It is 
argued that settler mortality rate more than 100 years ago have no direct impact 
on current GDP per capita other than through development of institutions. We 
revisit this theory and seek alternative ways of investigating the effect of 
institutions on economic performance. We observe that the quality of institutions 
in the past seems to affect economic performance in the past. This is supported 
by data and recent studies on the role of institutions in economic performance. 
We further observe that early economic performance tended to persist. Therefore, 
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the use of historical variables as instruments for current institutions may lead to 
false results because historical variables may influence past economic 
performance via past institutions. Therefore, this chapter aims to investigate the 
impact of institutions on economic performance without using historical variables. 
Instead of using historical variables, we use value fractionalization which we 
created in chapter 2. As a measure of value fractionalization, we use value 
fractionalization based on cultural framework by Inglehart in this chapter. Here, 
we hypothesize that value fractionalization affects economic performance only 
through current institutions. One explanation is that, in highly fragmented 
countries with respect to human values, it is not easy to agree on the form of the 
institutions and institution is required to be more complicated. Further, our theory 
is supported by some papers that estimate the effect of the quality of institutions 
on economic performance using commonly used cultural diversity measure as 
instruments for institutions in IV estimation. Therefore, this chapter avoids some 
concerns applied to previous studies and plays a complementary role. Using value 
fractionalization, we improve robustness of the results obtained in AJR and show 
that the quality of institution has impact on economic development. The use of 
value fractionalization as an instrument for the quality of institutions makes it 
possible to mitigate concerns about the quality of historical data. In addition, we 
do not use the theory based on colonial policy so that our hypothesis improves the 
robustness of the results by including countries that have been less affected by 
Europeans. In addition, we perform several types of robustness checks in chapter 
3. Firstly, we check whether our core result is robust to inclusion of variables such 
as dummies for British and French colonies. Secondly, we replace current 
institutions with the average value of institutions in order to avoid reverse 
causation. Thirdly, we test the validity of our approach by including value 
fractionalization as an exogenous variable. As a result, we find that the coefficient 
of value fractionalization is insignificant so that this supports that value 
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fractionalization is a valid instrument. Fourthly, we add panel estimations and 
show that our results are robust. Fifthly, by showing that the use of value 
fractionalization based on different definitions has no influence on our main 
results, we find that main results are robust to the definition of value 
fractionalization. Finally, additional robust tests are performed in the chapter. 
 
 
In summary, this chapter aims: 
1 To revisit the existing theory constructed by AJR, 2001. 
2 To seek alternative ways of investigating the impact of institutions on economic 
performance. More specifically, we use value fractionalization instead of historical 
variables as instrument for institutions in IV estimation. 
3 To determine whether institution plays an important role not only for ex-colonies 
but also for countries less affected by the Europeans. 
 
 
 
1.2.3 Contribution and Overview of Chapter 4  
 
  Causal effect of culture on economic outcomes has been widely investigated 
(Breuer and McDermott, 2013; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011; Guiso et al., 
2006; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Tabellini, 2010). In this chapter, we attempt to 
reevaluate the effect of culture on economic outcomes. The difficulty of 
estimating the impact of culture stems from the influence of economic 
development on social life (Inglehart and Baker, 2010).  That is, causality 
between culture and economic outcomes can be in both directions. Therefore, we 
try to find exogenous source of variation in culture and use an instrumental-
11 
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variables approach in this chapter. Tabellini (2010) uses the literacy rate in Europe 
at the end of the nineteenth century and the past political institutions as 
instruments for culture in the analysis. Our approach draws from Guiso et al. 
(2006), Breuer and Mcdermott (2013) and Zak and Knack (2001). In Guiso et al. 
(2006), trust is instrumented using the religious denominations and the country of 
origin of the ancestors. The instruments used in Breuer and Mcdermott (2013) 
contain religion and Zak and Knack (2001) use the religious denominations as 
instruments for trust. 
  Our strategy is to use value affiliation (value type) as an instrument for culture 
in IV estimation. Unlike previous studies that recognize historical variables and 
religious affiliations as exogenous source of variation in culture, we identify 
proportion of value types as exogenous sources of variation in culture5. In order 
to construct value type, we use Schwartz’s framework in this chapter. There are 
several advantages for our approach. Firstly, as argued in “Background and 
Motivation”, lack of a uniform criterion to define religious affiliation leads to our 
approach that avoids the use of the proportion of religion in a country. Secondly, 
the use of historical variables as instruments for current culture may lead to 
misleading conclusions because historical variables may have an impact on past 
economic performance through past culture and past economic performance 
persisted to the present. Finally, the use of religious affiliation is not so convincing 
for some specific countries. According to the WVS, only 27 percent of people agree 
with the importance of religion in Sweden. In Japan, 21 percent of individuals 
think that religion is important or rather important6. Further, in 2010, it is shown 
that 76.4 percent of people in Czech Republic are religiously unaffiliated. In Japan 
                                                   
5 We assume that proportion of cultural traits in a society affects creation of 
culture. As the probability of meeting with the same value type depends on the 
population shares of value types in a society, proportion of value type affects 
creation of culture. 
6 In contrast, about 100 percent of people in Egypt, Jordan, and Libya think that 
religion is important or rather important in their lives 
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57 percent of country population is classified as unaffiliated (Pew Research 
Reports). It is beneficial to seek for alternative instruments because religion may 
have a small impact on formation of culture in some non-religious countries. As a 
measure of culture, we see the role of respect for others (respect, for short) on 
economic performance. Respect has been considered as one of the key 
determinants of economic development and constructed using WVS. We find that 
value type, proportion of individuals who share similar thoughts and values, plays 
an important role in estimating the impact of culture on economic performance.  
  This chapter follows Breuer and Mcdermott (2013) so that respect is 
instrumented using two instruments. They use civil liberty index as one of the 
instruments for respect because the protection of civil liberties affects culture. 
We follow this way and exploit civil liberty index as one of our instruments. 
Another instrument they used is that the proportions of the populations that are 
identified as Catholic or Protestant. Instead of this instrument, we use “the 
proportions of the populations that are identified as a certain value type.” This is 
because proportion of value type seems to affect creation of values and has no 
direct impact on economic outcomes.  
  Our results show that respect for others has positive impact on economic 
outcomes and are robust to various treatments and under alternative samples. We 
are also interested in countries where people think that religion is not so 
important in their lives. According to our results, we find that respect for others 
affects economic outcomes not only in religious countries but also in non-religious 
countries. In addition, this chapter performs several types of robustness checks. 
First, we include 10 variables, one at a time, that are candidate for omitted 
variables- “Trust”, “Independence”, “Hard work”, “Feeling of Responsibility”, 
“Imagination”, “Thrift saving money and things”, “Determination perseverance”, 
“Religious faith”, “Unselfishness”, and “Obedience”. The effect of respect on 
economic outcomes remains significant. Second, we check if our core result is 
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robust to inclusion of variables such as dummies for French legal origin and ethnic 
fractionalization. Third, we add trust that is believed to have impact on economic 
outcomes. Finally, we change criteria for selecting religious countries and non-
religious countries. Despite several treatments mentioned here this chapter finds 
that the main results remain. 
 
 
In summary, this chapter aims: 
1 To review the role culture in economic performance. 
2 To identify problems associated with previous studies that estimate the impact 
of culture on economic outcomes. More specifically, we argue the validity of the 
use of historical variables and religious affiliation as instruments for culture in IV 
estimation. 
3 To check robustness of previous literature that shows the impact of culture on 
economic performance by using alternative instrument (value type). 
4 To investigate the role of culture not only for full sample but also for non-
religious countries. Our strategy does not rely on religion so that we investigate 
the role of culture not only for full sample but also for non-religious countries. 
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Chapter Two: Cultural Diversity based 
on Human Values 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
  
 
 
The role of cultural diversity in economic outcomes, government performance and 
social stability has been empirically investigated. The measures of cultural 
diversity mainly focus on diversity of ethnicity, religion and language. However, 
there has been little discussion about diversity in human values. This section 
identifies problems associated with the current measurement of ethnic, religious 
and language diversity. Then, this study proposes an index of “diversity in human 
values” using data from World Values Survey. The purpose of this chapter is to 
construct a new measure of cultural diversity that focuses on people’s values and 
to examine the significance of introducing the new measure “value diversity”.  
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2.1 Introduction 
 
  A considerable amount of literature has been published on the role of 
cultural diversity. Much of the current literature on cultural diversity pays 
attention to diversity of ethnicity, language, and religion. Cultural diversity 
affects economic growth (Easterly and Levine, 1997 and Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2005), trust (Zak and Knack, 2001), government performance 
(Alesina et al. 2003 and La porta et al., 1999), social stability (Nettle et al., 
2007), and democratization (Akdede, 2010). Cultural diversity has positive 
and negative effects on society. 
  This chapter first examines problems with the prevailing indices of cultural 
diversity. Previous studies on cultural diversity mainly focus on diversity of 
ethnicity, religion and language. However, there has been no discussion on 
the impact of diversity of internal traits such as human values. A 
characteristic of this chapter lies in proposing a new index of cultural 
diversity based on human values. We call this new index “value diversity”. As 
a measure of value diversity, we propose “value fractionalization” and “value 
polarization”. This chapter also constructs the proportion of the people who 
share similar values. This chapter discusses the advantage of introducing 
value diversity mainly from the difference between diversity in internal traits 
and external traits. We then discuss the significance of our measures in 
economic analysis in chapters 3 and 4. As a starting point, it is important to 
investigate how to measure value diversity.  
  In order to construct value diversity, it is required to recognize important 
dimensions of human values. This chapter mainly uses Inglehart’s approach 
to human values. According to Inglehart’s approach, human values can be 
represented in a 2-dimensional value space (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). World 
Values Survey (WVS)7 is used to construct value diversity index. The way of 
                                                   
7 World Values Survey is designed to enable a cross-cultural comparison of many aspects 
values and norms. See http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp/ for a 
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creating value diversity index is the following. Firstly, this study selects some 
survey questions which are important dimensions of human values. Secondly, 
individuals who made similar responses are classified into the same group. 
This study calls this group “value type”8. Finally, we derive value diversity 
index from the population shares of the value types in a country. 
  Difficulty in measuring widely used fractionalization measure is argued in 
Fish and Brooks (2004). They state that “Freedom House provides information 
on the size of what it defines as ethnic groups. Freedom House’s numbers on 
ethnic composition are vulnerable to criticism. Perhaps the most serious 
deficiency is the absence of a uniform criterion to define ethnicity…Thus for 
Freedom House, “ethnicity” may refer to race (meaning physiognomy and 
skin color), language, religion, or some combination thereof.” As we 
automatically divide individuals into value types, our measure mitigates this 
problem. In addition to this, the significance of introducing value diversity is 
as follows. Unlike using external traits such as ethnicity, it makes it possible 
to address the role of fractionalization in internal traits such as values and 
beliefs. Our index of cultural diversity is better suited to capture cultural 
diversity in internal traits than commonly used measures. 
Moreover, as globalization advances, it becomes difficult for each 
individual to identify her own ethnicity, religion or language. For example, a 
person who brought up with more than one language finds it difficult to 
identify her native language. Introduction of diversity measure based on 
human values will be useful in order to solve the above-mentioned difficulties. 
In addition, the introduction of diversity in internal traits contributes to 
evaluate economic problem. This is because value diversity affects 
                                                   
detailed description of WVS  
8  Suppose we construct 3 value types-value type 1, value type 2 and value 
type 3. It means that individuals in value type 1 made similar responses to 
the survey questions. The same is true of value type 2 and value type 3. We 
treat value types as ethnic, language or religious affiliations. Therefore, we 
use the proportions of the populations that are identified as value type 1, 
value type 2 and value type 3 to create value diversity. 
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institutions, which in turn impacts economic performance (Acemoglu et al. 
2001). Basically, people in a country create institutions as they like so that 
value diversity has a certain impact on institutions. Human values are hidden 
but, hidden heterogeneity affects institutions. For instance, when people 
vote, they express their values. The quality of institutions is partly 
determined by voting results so that value diversity affects institutions. 
  This chapter makes the following contributions to the current literature. 
Firstly, this study adds new dimension of cultural diversity that is different 
from ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity. Further, we construct value 
diversity index based on other definitions. Positive and significant 
relationships are found between our measure and value diversity indices 
based on other definitions. Moreover, this study observes some interesting 
properties of value fractionalization. Finally, the measures created in this 
chapter are found to be useful for estimating the impact of institutions on 
economic performance. More specifically, the use of new measures makes it 
possible to avoid some concerns of possible criticism applied to previous work. 
Further, our knowledge of the impact of institutions on economic 
performance is complemented by the use of our new measures9. 
  The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes 
positive and negative aspects of cultural diversity. Section 2.3 provides 
commonly used measures of cultural diversity. Section 2.4 presents the 
significance of creating cultural diversity measure based on human values. It 
also introduces two cultural frameworks- Cultural framework by Inglehar and 
by Schwartz. Then, we create value type and cultural diversity measure based 
on human values in this section. Section 2.5 provides attractive features of 
our approach. Section 2.6 summarizes the study and provides concluding 
remarks. 
 
                                                   
9 See chapters 3 and 4. 
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2.2 Cultural Diversity 
 
  The positive and the negative aspects of cultural diversity are discussed in 
this section. 
A large number of literatures have investigated the effects of cultural 
diversity on economic outcomes. Ager and Bruckner (2011) investigate the 
effect of immigration in US counties for the time period between 1870-1920. 
They find that culturally fragmented counties inclined to experience the 
increases in output per capita. According to Nettle (2000), linguistically 
homogeneous countries tend to be wealthier than linguistically fragmented 
countries. Nettle et al. (2007) show that linguistic fragmentation leads to 
poor economic performance. Easterly and Levine (1997) show that ethnic 
fragmentation negatively affects economic growth in Africa. This implies that 
ethnic fragmentation is a factor of Africa’s poor economic performance. 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) show that ethnic fragmentation and linguistic 
fragmentation have negative impacts on per capita growth.  
  Recent research show that trust contributes to economic success. In Zak 
and Knack (2001), it is shown that social homogeneity promotes trust. They 
show that higher trust increases investment and growth controlling for the 
factors that predict economic performance. Knack (1999) argues that high-
trust societies can achieve higher economic growth due to lower transaction 
costs. According to Knack and Keefer (1997), innovation hardly takes place in 
low-trust societies. It is argued that, in low-trust societies, entrepreneurs 
need to devote more time monitoring their employees instead of devoting 
more time innovating new products. As described above, trust plays an 
important role in economic outcomes and a large and growing body of 
literature has investigated determinants of trust. Ethnic diversity is generally 
associated with lower levels of trust (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2002). There are two hypotheses explaining the relationship 
between ethnic diversity and trust: conflict hypothesis and contact 
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hypothesis. Conflict hypothesis states that intergroup contact will lead to an 
increase in conflict, as groups compete, or perceived themselves to be 
competing, over finite material resources (Dincer, 2011). According to the 
conflict hypothesis, cultural diversity decreases trust. People inclined to 
socialize with people who are similar to themselves (Delhey and Newton 
2005). Therefore, the more people live in a society with people who belong 
to another ethnic group, the more they trust their own group and the less 
they trust the other group. Using cross-country data, Delhey and Newton 
(2005) find a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and trust. Alesina 
and La Ferrara (2002) find a negative relationship between ethnic 
fractionalization and trust using U.S data from General Social Survey (GSS). 
According to contact hypothesis, as people have more contact with people 
who belong to other ethnic groups, they trust them more. Uslaner (2006) 
states that cultural diversity leads to lower trust if there is lack of contact 
between people who belong to different ethnic groups. Using U.S. and 
Canadian data, Stolle et al. (2008) find that people who are regularly in 
contact with the other people are less affected by their ethnicity than people 
who lack contact. 
  Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) find that, in the US, cities and counties 
with high ethnic fractionalization tend to spend less on public goods such as 
education, roads, swearers and trash pickup. Thus, there is a negative link 
between ethnic fractionalization and investment in public goods.  
  There are papers that investigate the link between cultural diversity and 
social instability. Nettle et al. (2007) explore the relationship between ethnic 
diversity, religious diversity, linguistic diversity and societal instability using 
Structural Equation Modelling. An index of political instability and an index 
of the occurrence of revolutions and coups are used as a proxy for societal 
instability. According to their result, there is a positive relationship between 
linguistic fractionalization and social instability. There is a large volume of 
published studies describing the role of cultural diversity in civil war. Some 
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show that ethnic diversity cause civil war (Reynol-Querol, 2002). However, 
there is no evidence that religious diversity has this effect (Gerring et. 
al.,2014) 
 A large and growing body of literature has demonstrated that people of 
different cultures play games differently (Roth et al., 1991). In contrast to 
cross-cultural experiments, game experiments between subjects from 
heterogeneous cultures are not widely investigated. Oxoby and Spraggon 
(2006) find that heterogeneity of subjects decreases cooperation in public 
goods game experiment. Castro (2008) shows that contribution level in public 
goods game experiment becomes lower when British and Italian subjects are 
grouped together compared to when they are in groups with the same 
nationality. Hence, in game experiment, heterogeneity of subjects may affect 
negatively to cooperative actions. Cultural diversity is closely related to 
heterogeneity of subjects. Thus, these results imply that cultural diversity 
negatively influences subjects’ cooperative behavior in public goods game 
experiment. 
  The effects of cultural diversity on democratization have been investigated. 
Akdede (2010) investigates the link between cultural diversity and 
democratization during the time period 1992 and 2006. The result shows that 
democratization is not affected by ethnic fractionalization. However, 
religious fractionalization affects democratization. Higher religious diversity 
leads to democratization.  
  With regard to the relationship between cultural diversity and government 
performance, La Porta et al. (1999) find that ethno-linguistically 
homogeneous countries tend to have better government performance. 
Alesina et al. (2003) show that ethnic and language diversity are important 
not only in economic success but also in the literacy rate, the infant mortality 
and the quality of government. Further, it is shown that religious diversity 
has no effect on the quality of government. 
  As shown in this section, many researchers have been investigated the role 
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of cultural diversity in various aspects of society. Definition of cultural 
diversity measure is argued in the next section. 
 
 
2.3 Fractionalization and Polarization 
 
  Before turning to construct cultural a diversity measure based on human 
values, this section briefly discusses the prevailing measure of cultural 
diversity. In order to measure cultural diversity, fractionalization index and 
polarization index are widely used in current literature. The fractionalization 
index measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a 
society are from different cultural groups and it is calculated as follows.  
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ≡ 1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Where the population shares of the cultural groups in a society are denoted 
as 𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3,,,, 𝑝𝑛 and  𝑛 is the number of cultural groups
10. 
This index takes 0 to 1 and is maximized when every individual in a society 
belongs to different cultural group.  
  As stated in section 2.2, a considerable amount of literature has been 
published on the role of cultural fractionalization in economic outcomes. It 
has been shown that cultural fractionalization seems to be a good explanatory 
variable for economic growth. However, Fearon and Latin (2003) find that 
ethnic fractionalization and religious fractionalization have no effect on the 
probability of civil wars. Instead, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) use 
polarization index to measure cultural diversity. 
The polarization index captures how far the distribution of the cultural groups 
is from a society dominated by two equal-size cultural groups. It is calculated 
as  
                                                   
10 Note that this measure is based on binary criteria of “belonging” or “not belonging”. 
This is because we used number of cultural groups here. Therefore, this index ignores the 
distance between cultural groups.  
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𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ≡ 1 − ∑ (
0.5 − 𝑝𝑖
0.5
)2𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Again, the population shares of the cultural groups in a society are denoted 
as 𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3,,,, 𝑝𝑛 and  𝑛 is the number of cultural groups. This measure 
is maximized when two groups are of equal size.  
  Table 2.1 shows some examples of fractionalization index and polarization 
index. In country D, people are evenly split between 3 cultural groups. In this 
case, cultural fractionalization is 0.67 and cultural polarization is 0.89. In 
country F, cultural fractionalization and cultural polarization is 0.75. Above-
mentioned measures of cultural diversity mainly focus on diversity of 
ethnicity, religion and language. The next section of this chapter uses the 
fractionalization index and polarization index to construct value 
fractionalization and value polarization.11 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. 1 Example-Cultural Fractionalization and Cultural Polarization 
 
Notes: “population shares” denotes the population shares of the cultural 
groups in a country. In Country A, Country B and Country C, there are two 
cultural groups. As for Countries D and E, there are three cultural groups. 
Four cultural groups exist in Country F.  
 
 
                                                   
11 We are interested in cultural diversity within a nation. Some papers also focus on 
diversity between a nation (Nettle et al., 2007). 
Country Number of Groups Population Shares Fractionalization Polarization
A 2 (1.0, 0.0) 0 0
B 2 (0.8,0.2) 0.32 0.64
C 2 (0.5, 0.5) 0.5 1
D 3 (0.33, 0.33, 0.33) 0.67 0.89
E 3 (0.2, 0.2, 0.6) 0.56 0.83
F 4 (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25) 0.75 0.75
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2.4 Cultural Diversity based on Human 
Values 
 
  This section discusses the significance of constructing cultural diversity 
measure based on human values. Further, this section introduces two cultural 
frameworks- Cultural framework by Inglehart and by Schwartz. Then, we 
create value type and cultural diversity measure based on human values. 
 
2.4.1 Why Cultural Diversity based on Human Values ? 
 
  A measure of diversity in human values addresses some shortcomings of 
previous studies. There are three advantages of introducing diversity measure 
based on human values.  
  Firstly, value diversity may capture new aspect of cultural diversity. There 
is a large volume of published studies describing the role of cultural diversity 
in economic outcomes and social indicators. However, previous studies on 
cultural diversity mainly focus on diversity of ethnicity, religion and language 
and there has been little discussion on the role of diversity in human values. 
Previous measures of cultural diversity based on “external traits”. On the 
other hand, value diversity measures cultural diversity based on “internal 
traits” such as belief and human values. Having not only diversity in external 
traits but also in internal traits can be beneficial. 
  The second advantage of using value fractionalization is that cultural 
diversity based on human values may solve some problems of using ethnicity, 
religion and language as a measure of cultural diversity. Recently, it becomes 
difficult for people to identify their own ethnicity, religion or language. As 
for language, a person who can speak more than one language fluently finds 
it difficult to identify her native language. Regarding ethnicity, Fish and 
Brooks (2004) state that ethnic affiliation seems to be vulnerable to criticism 
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because definition of ethnicity is somewhat ambiguous. With regard to 
religion, some people have more than one religion. According to the CIA World 
Fact Book, 83.9 percent of Japanese are classified as Shintoism, 71.4 percent 
as Buddhism, 2 percent as Christianity, and 7.8 percent as others. Total 
exceeds 100 percent because many Japanese belong to both Shintoism and 
Buddhism (CIA Fact Book). Worse, 57 percent of people in Japan are 
religiously unaffiliated (Pew Research Reports). Therefore, it might be 
difficult to grasp accurate proportion of religious, language, and ethnic 
affiliations.  
  In contrast, this chapter automatically classifies individuals into several 
groups so that our measure mitigates the concern that definition of cultural 
group might be ambiguous. Further, as we classify individuals into value types 
total is always 100 percent and this suits the definitions of fractionalization 
and polarization indices. Moreover, as stated in section 2.2, introduction of 
value diversity enables us to investigate the role of diversity in internal traits 
that has not been investigated in current literature. 
 
 
2.4.2 Cultural Framework 
 
2.4.2.1 Cultural Framework by Inglehart 
 
  World Values Survey (WVS) provides a cross-cultural measure of peoples’ 
values. Many aspects of human values (concern) such as attitude toward 
politics, economy, religion and family are asked in the survey. To date various 
methods have been developed and introduced to identify the character of 
values useful in describing cultures. This study highlights two frameworks to 
describe cultures. That is cultural framework by Inglehart and cultural 
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framework by Schwartz. 
  Inglehart (1997) proposes a cultural framework using data from WVS. The 
study analyzes 43 societies based on 22 items from WVS. By principal 
components factor analysis, it is found that first two dimensions account for 
51 percent of the cross-national variation among these items. Further, 
additional dimensions explain relatively small amount of cross-national 
variations among them. It is reported that these two dimensions are robust 
to dropping items included in the research. Inglehart and Baker (2000) 
extracted two factors at both individual and country levels using 10 items 
from WVS. They named two factors “traditional versus secular-rational12 ” 
dimension and “survival versus self-expression 13 ” dimension. These two 
dimensions are robust because many researchers obtained similar results 
from other combinations of survey questions from WVS14. Survey questions 
that Inglehart and Baker (2000) used are shown in Table 2.2. Traditional values 
emphasize “Importance of God”, “Teach Children Obedience and Faith rather 
than Independence and Determination”, “Disapproval of Abortion”, “National 
Pride”, and “Respect for Authority”. On the other hand, survival values 
emphasize “Priority for Economic and Physical Security”, “Feeling of 
Unhappiness”, “Abstaining from Signing Petitions”, “Disapproval of 
Homosexuality” and “Distrusting in Other People” 
 
 
                                                   
12 Secular-rational values have the opposite preferences to the traditional 
values. 
13 Self-expression values have the opposite preferences to the survival 
values. 
14 According to Inglehart and Welzel (2010), “The resulting cross-cultural 
map is so robust that, using a completely different way of measuring basic 
values, different types of samples and a different type of dimensional 
analysis Schwartz finds very similar transnational groupings among 76 
countries”. Further, “traditional versus secular-rational” dimension and 
“survival versus self-expression” dimension appear in analysis using 
different sets of years and countries (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Baker, 
2000, Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). 
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Table 2. 2 Ten Items for Inglehart’s Dimensions 
Traditional vs. Secular-Rational values (Traditional values emphasize the 
following) 
God is important in respondent’s life. 
It is more important for a child to learn obedience and religious faith than 
independence and determination (i.e.Autonomy index). 
Abortion is never justifiable. 
Respondent has strong sense of national pride. 
Respondent favors more respect for authority 
Survival vs. Self-Expression values (Survival values emphasize the following) 
Respondent gives priority to economic and physical security over self-
expression and quality-of-life (i.e. Materialist/Postmaterialist values index) 
Respondent describes self as not very happy. 
Respondent has not signed and would not sign a petition 
Homosexuality is never justifiable. 
You have to be very careful about trusting people. 
Source: Inglehart and Baker (2000, p24) 
 
 
These two dimensions explain more than 70 percent of the cross-national 
variance on these items. These dimensions make it possible to locate 
individuals and each society on a global map15. Figure 2.1 shows the locations 
of societies based on these two dimensions in wave 4, 1996. Average score of 
traditional vs. secular-rational score and survival vs. self-expression score are 
used to derive national scores. We can see similarities between cultures by 
this map.  A cultural map in wave 5 (2008) is shown in Appendix-Figure 2.1 
Further, a map in wave 6 (2010-2014) is shown in Appendix-Figure 2.2.  
  We observe that Protestant Europe such as Sweden has high scores in 
Secular-rational and Self-expression values. Countries in Ex-communist tend 
                                                   
15 This thesis aims to seek diversity in human values so that we are not going to place 
individuals into this cultural map. Therefore, this thesis uses items that are used to create 
“traditional versus secular-rational” dimension and “survival versus self-expression” 
dimension.  
30 
 
30 
 
to have high scores in Secular-rational and Survival values. Further, English 
speaking countries inclined to have high Traditional and Self-expression 
values. 
 
 
Figure 2. 1 Map of countries (wave 4, 1996) 
Source: World Values Survey  
Extracted from: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp 
 
 
2.4.2.2 Cultural Framework by Schwartz 
 
  Schwartz (1992, 1999) discusses basic human values. Schwartz (1992) states 
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that “Values (a) are concepts or beliefs, (b) pertain to desirable end states 
or behaviors, (c) transcend specific situations, (d) guide selection or 
evaluation of behavior and events, and (e) are ordered by relative importance. 
(page 4)”. Further it is stated that “the primary content aspect of a value is 
the type of goal or motivational concern that it expresses. (page 4)”. 
Schwartz adopts widely used conception of values (Feather, 1995 etc.) and 
proposed 10 Schwartz values that relates to motivational goal. 
The following are the 10 broad basic values that Schwartz specifies, 
each followed by its motivational goal: 
 
In Schwartz (1992), the following ten different types of human values are 
shown. 
Power: Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and 
resources 
Achievement: Personal success through domonstrating competence 
according to   social Standards 
Hedonism: Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself. 
Stimulation: Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life. 
Self-direction: Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, 
exploring. 
Universalism: Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for 
the welfare of all people and for nature. 
Benevolence: Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with 
whom one is in frequent personal contact. 
Tradition: Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas 
that traditional culture or religion provide. 
Conformity: Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset 
or harm others and violate social expectations or norms. 
Security: Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of 
self. 
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Schwartz summarized these 10 values with the following two orthogonal 
dimensions; Self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence dimension and 
Openness to change vs. Conservatism dimension. Appendix-Figure 2.3 shows 
relations between ten motivational types of value. Further, the followings 
show the explanation for each dimension. 
 
Two dimensions by Schwartz 
Self-enhancement vs. Self-transcendence:  
“This dimension captures the conflict between values that emphasize 
concern for the welfare and interests of others (universalism, benevolence) 
and values that emphasize pursuit of one's own interests and relative success 
and dominance over others (power, achievement). Hedonism shares elements 
of both openness to change and self-enhancement (Schwartz, 2012).” 
Openness to change vs. Conservatism: 
“This dimension captures the conflict between values that emphasize 
independence of thought, action, and feelings and readiness for change (self-
direction, stimulation) and values that emphasize order, selfrestriction, 
preservation of the past, and resistance to change (security, conformity, 
tradition) (Schwartz, 2012).” 
 
  WVS contains 10 questions that represent these 10 values. This paper uses 
cultural framework by Schwartz in chapter 4 so that we discuss them later. 
 
 
2.4.3 Value Types 
 
  In contrast to ethnicity, language, and religion there are no pre-determined 
groupings for human values. There are many ways to group individuals into 
some groups that share similar values. Suppose we select one dichotomous 
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question from WVS. Then, it is easy to classify individuals into two value types. 
“Value type A” consists of individuals who answered YES to the question and 
“Value type B” consists of individuals who answered NO. However, this way 
captures only one aspect of human values. Another simple way to create 
value type is to classify individuals into four groups as follows:  
 
Suppose there are 2 questions, Question A and Question B. 
Group 1; Positive response to Question A and Positive response to Question B 
Group 2; Positive response to Question A and Non-positive response to 
Question B 
Group 3; Non-positive response to Question A and Positive response to 
Question B 
Group 4; Non-positive response to Question A and Non-positive response to 
Question B 
  
 This grouping method captures two aspects of human values at the same 
time. However, it is doubtful to say that Question A and Question B are 
important dimensions of human values. Therefore, instead of using a simple 
way, this study uses k-means cluster analysis in order to classify respondents 
into groups. By this grouping method, individuals in the same group share 
common characteristics. We call these groups “value types”.  
  Cluster analysis is the way of partitioning individuals into a small number 
of groups. Suppose we have n individuals (observations) and we are going to 
partition them into k groups (clusters). In this case, our goal is to assign a 
group to each individual. Firstly, cluster analysis initializes the centre of the 
clusters. Then, (1) we calculate the Euclidean distance between the 
observation and the cluster centre and assign a group to the cluster whose 
distance from the cluster centre is minimum among all the other clusters. (2) 
A new cluster centre will then be recalculated as the position of each cluster 
to the mean for observations in each cluster. Cluster analysis performs (1) 
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and (2) in a loop until no more relocations occur. That is, the iteration stops 
when each observation is nearest to its own cluster centre than that of the 
other cluster. 
   This section constructs value type and value diversity using Inglehart’s 
approach. The third wave to the sixth wave of WVS data is used. We excluded 
the first two waves because these waves are weighted with developed 
countries. We use data collected in Wave 3 (1994-1998), Wave 4 (1999-2004), 
Wave 5 (2005-2009) and Wave 6 (2010-2014).  
Using 10 Inglehart items16 , we first group individuals into three groups 
(value types) by cluster analysis17. We call these groups value type 1, value 
type 2, and value type 3. Therefore, individuals classified as each value type 
share similar values. More precisely, respondents in value type 1 made similar 
responses to the 10 items. The same is true of people classified as value type 
2 and value type 3. As the same religious affiliation share the same religion, 
the same value type share the similar values. Now we come to know 
population shares of each value type in each wave, it is possible to create 
proportion of each value type by wave.  
  Appendix-Table 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 show the distribution of the 
population of value types among the countries in each wave. Table 2.3 shows 
value type and main society of each value type. An individual classified as 
“Value type 1” tends to abstain from petition and disapprove abortion. It is 
found that many people in South Asia and Africa are grouped into value type 
1. In wave 5, 92.21 percent of people in Rwanda are value type 1. As for 
Jordan, 99.02 percent of respondents are classified as value type 1. Value 
type 2 mainly consists with people who do not show greater respect for 
authority and people who trust others compared with other value types. We 
                                                   
16 See Appendix 2.4 “Ten items from cultural framework by Inglehart” for details 
17 This chapter chooses three value types because grouping into two types is close to 
population shares rather than diversity. Further, we do not use more than three types 
because it is complicated. Section 2.5.2 considers whether our diversity measure is robust 
to defining value fractionalization in different number of groups and shows that value 
fractionalization measure is robust to changing number of groups. 
35 
 
35 
 
observe that many individuals in Protestant Europe and Confucian countries 
are classified as value type 2. As seen in Appendix-Table 2.4, 72.51 percent 
of people are value type 2 in Sweden (wave 6).  According to Appendix-Table 
2.3, 66.92 percent of individuals are classified as value type 2 in wave 5. On 
the other hand, 0 percent of people in Jordan are classified as value type 2 
in wave 4. In addition, 0.36 of people in Jordan have value type 2. This means 
that it is difficult for people classified as value type 2 to meet with people 
who share similar values in Jordan. Individuals classified as value type 3 have 
a tendency to approve homosexuality and show greater national pride. In USA, 
46.65 percent of respondents are classified as value type 3 in wave6. USA and 
Canada have many value type 3 individuals. The next section constructs value 
type and value fractionalization for each wave. Then, we see the properties 
of them. 
 
 
Table 2. 3 Value Types and Main Societies 
 
Notes: People in value type 1 mainly consist with individuals who tend to 
abstain from petition and disapprove abortion compared with other value 
types. In comparison with other value types, individuals classified as value 
type 2 do not show greater respect for authority and do not trust others. 
People in value type 3 tend to approve homosexuality and show greater 
national pride. “Main society” means that most of the people in Algeria are 
classified as value type 1. 
 
 
 
Value type Main Society
China France Germany Japan Norway Swedem
  
United States  Canada
Algeria Bangladesh Jordan Morocco NigeriaValue type 1
Value type 2
Value type 3
Abstain from petition and disapprove abortion
Do not show greater respect for authority and people who trust others
Approve homosexuality and show greater national pride
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2.4.4 Value Diversity: Value Fractionalization and Value 
Polarization 
 
  As a measure of value diversity, we propose “value fractionalization index18” 
and “value polarization index19”. Value fractionalization is calculated from 
fractionalization index and value polarization is calculated using polarization 
index. As seen in Appendix-Table 2.1-2.4, we know the population shares of 
the value types in a society, we can create value fractionalization and value 
polarization by wave. These indices are calculated as follows. 
 
 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑡 ≡ 1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑡
2𝑛
𝑖=1  
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑡 ≡ 1 − ∑ (
0.5 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡
0.5
)2𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
where the population shares of the value types in a country at wave 𝑡 are 
denoted 𝑝1𝑡 , 𝑝2𝑡 ,,  𝑝𝑛𝑡 and  𝑛 is the number of groups. In the previous 
section, we used three groups. As we grouped individuals into three groups in 
section 2.4, we basically assume 𝑛 = 3. 
  Table 2.4 and table 2.5 provide heterogeneous countries and homogeneous 
countries with respect to human values. As can be seen from the tables, 
Canada is highly fragmented with respect to human values. In wave 4, 30.73 
percent of individuals are value type 1. 24.97 percent of people are classified 
as value type 2 and 44.3 percent as value type3. Therefore, in wave 4, value 
fractionalization index for Canada is 0.65 and 0.64 in wave 5. Canada has the 
highest value fractionalization scores in wave 4 and wave 5. 
  On the other hand, Jordan is one of the most homogeneous countries with 
                                                   
18 The term value fractionalization is used in this thesis to represent one of the measures 
of diversity in human values. Value fractionalization captures the probability that two 
randomly selected individuals in a society have different value types. 
19 The term value polarization has been used as one of the indicators of cultural diversity 
based on human values. Value polarization captures how far the distribution of value types 
is from bipolar (1/2,1/2, 0, 0, ..,0) which represents the highest (1) polarization. 
37 
 
37 
 
regard to human values. 97.89 percent of individuals are classified as value 
type 1, 0 percent as value type 2 and 2.11 percent as value type 3 in Jordan 
(wave 4)20. 
 
Table 2. 4 Heterogeneous Countries (Value fractionalization) 
 
Notes: The number shows value fractionalization index in each wave. 
Heterogeneous countries with respect to human values are shown in the table. 
Wave 3 (1994-1998), Wave 4 (1999-2004), Wave 5 (2005-2009) and Wave 6 
(2010-2014). 
 
Table 2. 5 Homogeneous Countries (Value fractionalization) 
 
Notes: The number shows value fractionalization index in each wave. 
Homogeneous countries with respect to human values are shown in the table. 
Wave 3 (1994-1998), Wave 4 (1999-2004), Wave 5 (2005-2009) and Wave 6 
(2010-2014). 
 
The difference between value fractionalization and value polarization can 
be observed in Figure 2.2. The figure plots value fractionalization index and 
value polarization index in wave 3. As seen in the figure, there is a significant 
positive correlation between value fractionalization index and value 
                                                   
20  Appendix-Table 2.2 
Croatia 0.66 Canada 0.65 Canada 0.64 Uruguay 0.66
Slovakia 0.66 Spain 0.65 Australia 0.64 Russia 0.65
Finland 0.66 Israel 0.64 Bulgaria 0.64 United States 0.63
Albania 0.66 Moldova 0.62 Russia 0.63 South Korea 0.62
Spain 0.66 South Korea 0.61 Ukraine 0.63 Germany 0.62
Mean 0.55 Mean 0.40 Mean 0.49 Mean 0.41
Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave6
India 0.42 Zimbabwe 0.08 Ethiopia 0.20 Tunisia 0.14
South Africa 0.38 Bangladesh 0.07 Georgia 0.19 Pakistan 0.12
Puerto Rico 0.34 Jordan 0.04 Rwanda 0.15 Morocco 0.11
Venezuela 0.32 Indonesia 0.03 Indonesia 0.12 Jordan 0.10
Nigeria 0.19 Pakistan 0.02 Jordan 0.02 Ghana 0.09
Mean 0.55 Mean 0.40 Mean 0.49 Mean 0.41
Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave6
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polarization index. This relationship can be seen in wave 4, wave 5, and wave 
6. Therefore, this thesis mainly uses value fractionalization index as a 
measure of value diversity. 
 
 
Figure 2. 2 Value Fractionalization index and Value Polarization index in Wave 
3.  
Notes: The Vertical Axis Value polarization index; The Horizontal Axis Value 
Fractionalization index 
 
2.5 Merits 
2.5.1 Comparison with Existing Measures 
 
  Using cultural diversity data from Alesina et al. (2003) 21 , this section 
observes the link between value fractionalization index and widely used 
measures of cultural fractionalization. We first aggregate all individuals and 
calculate value fractionalization for each country. Therefore, we ignore 
                                                   
21  Fractionalization index that is defined in section 2.3 is used in Alesina et al. (2003). 
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waves. Figure 2.3 presents simple plots of value fractionalization and ethnic 
fractionalization.  
 
Figure 2. 3 Value Fractionalization index and Ethnic Fractionalization index 
Notes: The Vertical Axis Ethnic Fractionalization index; The Horizontal Axis 
Value Fractionalization index 
 
We observe a negative relationship between ethnic fractionalization and 
value fractionalization (r =-0.39, p < .01) 22. One of the most homogeneous 
counties with respect to ethnicity is Bangladesh. Ethnic fractionalization 
index in Bangladesh is 0.05 and value fractionalization is 0.07. One of the 
most homogeneous countries with respect to ethnicity is also one of the most 
homogeneous countries with regard to values. Despite a negative link 
between ethnic fractionalization and value fractionalization, it seems that 
value fractionalization captures something different from ethnicity. 
  Figure 2.4 shows the link between value fractionalization and language 
                                                   
22  See Appendix-table 6 for correlation matrix of value, ethnic, language and religious 
fractionalization indices. 
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fractionalization. As seen in the figure, we do not find significant relationship 
between diversity based on language and human values. This suggests that 
value fractionalization captures different aspect of peoples’ heterogeneity.  
 
 
Figure 2. 4 Value Fractionalization index and Language Fractionalization 
index 
 
 
Now, we turn to see the relationship between value fractionalization and 
religious fractionalization. As seen in the figure 2.5, it has a positive 
relationship between these two measures (r = 0.29, p < .01) 23.. However, 
countries that are highly fragmented with respect to religion but highly 
homogeneous with respect to human values are observed. For instance, value 
fractionalization index in Ghana is low with 0.15 (mean; 0.45) but, highly 
fragmented with respect to religion because the religious fractionalization 
index is 0.80 (mean; 0.45). By contrast, religious fractionalization in Lebanon 
is 0.79 and it is similar to that of Ghana. However, value fractionalization in 
                                                   
23  See Appendix-table 6 for correlation matrix of value, ethnic, language and religious 
fractionalization indices. 
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Lebanon is 0.52. This also suggests that value fractionalization grasps some 
different aspects of heterogeneity in a society. 
 
 
Figure 2. 5 Value Fractionalization index and Religious Fractionalization index 
Notes: The Vertical Axis Religious Fractionalization index; The Horizontal Axis 
Value Fractionalization index 
 
  In addition to the above-mentioned countries, two striking examples 
demonstrate that the value fractionalization captures a new aspect of 
cultural heterogeneity. 
  Appedinx-table 2.6 shows value, ethnic, language, and religious 
fractionalization for each country. Data for ethnic, language, and religious 
fractionalization is taken from Alesina et al. (2003) and value 
fractionalization is calculated by aggregating data from wave 3 to wave 6. On 
one hand, according to Appedinx-table 2.6, Argentina can be considered 
ethnically homogenous, religiously homogeneous and linguistically 
homogeneous. Ethnic fractionalization index in Argentina is 0.26 (mean; 0.40), 
religious fractionalization is 0.22 (mean; 0.45) and language fractionalization 
is 0.06 (mean; 0.36). However, Argentina is fragmented with respect to 
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human values because Argentina has high value fractionalization: 0.58 (mean; 
0.45). On the other hand, Tanzania is homogeneous with respect to human 
values (value fractionalization in Tanzania is 0.10 (mean; 0.45)). However, 
ethnic fractionalization index in Tanzania is 0.74 (mean; 0.40), religious 
fractionalization is 0.63 (mean; 0.45) and language fractionalization is 0.90 
(mean; 0.36). Therefore, Tanzania is homogeneous with regard to human 
values but heterogeneous from the aspects of ethnicity, religion and language. 
  Overall, several interesting examples demonstrate that the value 
fractionalization captures aspect that is different from commonly used 
cultural fractionalization measures. 
 
2.5.2 Different Number of Groups 
 
  This chapter classifies individuals into three groups. Now, it considers 
whether our diversity measure is robust to defining value fractionalization in 
alternative ways. In order to investigate whether our measure depends on 
the definition, we create value fractionalization measures based on 4 groups, 
5 groups, …, and 10 groups. More specifically, we classify individuals into 
more than 3 groups using k-means cluster analysis. After the analysis, each 
value fractionalization index is calculated using the population shares of the 
value types in a society. Now, we have 8 different value fractionalization 
measures. Table 2.6 shows the correlation matrix of value fractionalization 
measures. As seen in the table, we observe that 8 different value 
fractionalization indices are highly correlated. This suggests that our value 
fractionalization measure is robust to changing grouping method. 
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Table 2. 6 Correlation Matrix of Value Fractionalization indices (Different 
Number of Groups) 
 
2.5.3 Value Diversity from Many Aspects 
 
     The approach exploited in this chapter has a number of attractive 
features. One of the features, unlike traditional measures, is that it enables 
us to observe cultural diversity for a specific group. In this section, we 
introduce (1) value fractionalization for people whose farther is immigrant, 
(2) value fractionalization for people whose mother is immigrant24, (3) value 
fractionalization for male and (4) value fractionalization for female.  
 
 2.5.3.1 Immigrant 
 
  It has been pointed out that people born in a given society have socially 
determined tendencies to share values that are common in the society. This 
subsection looks at this using our value fractionalization index. 
   Hitlin and Piliavan (2004) mention that basic values are relatively stable 
after formative period. In the case of migration, inherited values and values 
affected by the new society may conflict. Bardi and Goodwin (2001) refer 
                                                   
24 We do not use value fractionalization for people whose father and mother is immigrant 
because of sample size. 
 
Notes: VF3 is an abbreviation for Value frac. Value frac. (i) ≡ 1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1  
 
Variables VF3 VF4 VF5 VF6 VF7 VF8 VF9 VF10
Value frac. (3) 1
Value frac. (4) 0.94 1
Value frac. (5) 0.96 0.97 1
Value frac. (6) 0.97 0.96 0.99 1
Value frac. (7) 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.99 1
Value frac. (8) 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.99 0.99 1
Value frac. (9) 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 1
Value frac. (10) 0.96 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 1
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that “value adaption” means people tend to accept new values (prevalent 
values). By value adaption, individuals likely to replace the values close to 
the ones common in their country of birth with ones common in their new 
residence25. This subsection addresses this value adaption. More specifically, 
we see whether shares of value types and value fractionalization are similar 
between people whose parents are immigrant and whose parents are not 
immigrant. To investigate the relationship between parents’ immigration and 
value fractionalization index, we see the following two questions from WVS- 
G026 and G027.  
 
“G 026 Mother Immigrant 
Is your mother immigrant to this country or not?” 
“G 027 Father Immigrant 
Is your father immigrant to this country or not?”  
 
  This subsection uses people who answered “Yes” or “No” in each question. 
Table 2.7 shows the proportion of individuals who are in each value type. First 
column shows the population share of each value type who answered yes to 
the question. 58.6 percent of people whose mother is not immigrant are 
classified as value type 1. As value composition differs across countries, it 
requires to be very cautious when we interpret these shares. Therefore, this 
section focuses on value fractionalization. Mean value fractionalization is 
calculated as follows. First, we calculate value fractionalization for people 
whose mother is immigrant in a country. Then, we take the average of them. 
We observe interesting findings here. Table 2.7 shows that individuals whose 
mother is not immigrant tend to have similar values compared with people 
whose mother is immigrant. Analogously, People whose father is immigrant 
tend to have heterogeneous values. This implies that that people (family) 
                                                   
25 The study of migrants’s values is shown in Berry’s theory of acculturation (Berry, 2011 
and Sam and Berry, 2010) 
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living in a society for a long period tend to share similar thoughts in the 
society. For instance, we look at Indonesia. Value fractionalization for people 
whose mother is immigrant is 0.46 in Indonesia. In contrast, value 
fractionalization for individuals whose mother is not immigrant is 0.12.  
As this subsection aims to clarify one of the attractive features of 
introducing value fractionalization, we would not examine for the role played 
by characteristics such as immigration status on value types and value 
fractionalization. This is because it requires cautious discussion to identify 
key determinant of values. In this stage, this thesis only gives the fact that 
people living in a society for a long period tend to share similar thoughts in 
the society. Future research might examine the effect of immigration status 
on value types and value fractionalization. 
 
 
 
Table 2. 7 Mean Value Fractionalization- Mother Immigrant and Father 
Immigrant 
 
Notes: Numbers for each value type is percentage of individuals. Mean value 
fractionalization index: We first calculate value fractionalization for people 
whose mother is immigrant in a country. Then, we take the average of them. 
 
2.5.3.2 Gender 
 
  One of the largest differences between our cultural diversity measure and 
widely used cultural diversity measure is that our measure has implications 
in analyzing cultural diversity by gender. This section focuses on mean value 
fractionalization for male and female. To create mean value fractionalization 
Value type 1 Value type 2 Value type 3 Mean value frac. Number of Countries
NO 58.6 17.6 23.8 0.57 63
YES 45.0 27.3 27.8 0.65 63
NO 58.7 17.6 23.8 0.57 63
YES 44.5 27.8 27.7 0.65 63
Mother Immigrant
Father Immigrant
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by gender, we calculate value fractionalization for male and female in each 
country26. Then, we take the average of these fractionalization indices. 
 As seen in table 2.8, female tend to have value type 2 and male tend to have 
many value type 3 individuals. Value type 2 consists with people who do not 
show greater respect for authority and people who trust others. In contrast 
people classified as value type 3 tend to approve homosexuality and show 
greater national pride. Table 2.8 finds no value fractionalization difference 
between male and female. In some countries, male is more diverse than 
female. However, in Sweden, value fractionalization for male is 0.38 and that 
for female is 0.50. Therefore, compared with female, male tend to share 
similar values in Sweden. In contrast, value fractionalization for male is 0.51 
and that for female is 0.43 in Dominican Republic. It is complex to interpret 
these differences so that we are not going to scrutiny this table. However, we 
observed that value fractionalization is not so different between male and 
female. WVS contains several questions that are interesting to see. For 
instance, one can create value fractionalization by age. This research will 
serve as a base for future studies. 
 
Table 2. 8 Mean value Fractionalization by gender 
 
Notes: Numbers for each value type is percentage of individuals. 
 
2.6 Concluding Remarks for Chapter 2 
 
  Cultural diversity plays an important role in various aspects of society. It 
has been measured from the aspects of ethnicity, religion and language. 
However, there has been no discussion about diversity in human values. This 
                                                   
26 X001 (Sex) from WVS 
Value type 1 Value type 2 Value type 3 Mean Value frac. Number of Countries
Male 55.7 24.6 19.7 0.45 63
Female 55.7 19.0 25.2 0.46 63
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study sets out to propose an index that considers diversity in human values 
(value diversity). Value diversity is introduced in order to add new dimension 
of cultural diversity. There are several advantages of introducing our new 
measure. One of the merits of our approach is related to group identities. 
Group identities are complex so that commonly used measure of cultural 
diversity has problems. Moreover, unlike prevailing measures that captures 
diversity in external traits, our measure captures diversity in internal traits. 
In order to find important dimensions for human values, cultural frameworks 
by Schwartz and by Inglehart are introduced. It is argued that 10 items for 
Inglehart’s approach and 10 items for Schwartz’s approach are included in 
the World Values Survey. Therefore, computation of value diversity indices 
relies on data from WVS. On the way to create value diversity, we create 
value type. Individuals who are grouped into the same value type have similar 
values with respect to 10 items. We first compare two value diversity 
measures-value fractionalization and value polarization. As we find that value 
fractionalization and value polarization is closely related, this chapter uses 
value fractionalization as a value diversity measure. The relationship 
between value fractionalization and other cultural diversity measures are 
investigated. Some striking examples show that value fractionalization 
captures the aspect that is different from traditional measures. Hence, value 
diversity index is expected to explain several phenomena which have not 
been grasped by other existing cultural diversity indices. This chapter further 
investigates the merits of introducing value diversity. As one of the merits 
this section investigates value diversity from two aspects. Firstly, we see 
value fractionalization for people whose father (mother) is immigrant. We 
observe that individuals (family) living in a society for a long period tend to 
share similar values inside the society. Secondly, this chapter constructs value 
fractionalization for male and for female. As a whole, the mean value 
fractionalization is almost the same between male and female. Further 
studies regarding the role of value diversity and value type in economic 
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outcomes and social indicators would be worthwhile. 
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Appendix 2.1 
 
Data Description and Sources 
Ethnic Fractionalization: Ethnic fractionalization index of each country 
constructed by Alesina et al. (2003). It captures the probability that two 
individuals, selected at random from a country’s population, will belong to 
different ethnic groups. Source: Alesina et al. (2003) 
Language Fractionalization: Langue fractionalization index of each country 
constructed by Alesina et al. (2003). It captures the probability that two 
individuals, selected at random from a country’s population, will belong to 
different language groups. Source: Alesina et al. (2003) 
Religious Fractionalization: Religious fractionalization index of each country 
constructed by Alesina et al. (2003). It captures the probability that two 
individuals, selected at random from a country’s population, will belong to 
different religious groups. Source: Alesina et al. (2003) 
Inglehart items: See Appendix 2.4 for details. Source: the WVS 
Schwartz items: A189-A198 Question wording: Now I will briefly describe 
some people. Using this card, would you please indicate for each description 
whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not 
like you, or not at all like you? (Code one answer for each description): 
Source: the WVS 
G 026 (Mother Immigrant): Question Wording “Is your mother immigrant to 
this country or not?” Answers  0 NO, 1 YES :Source: the WVS 
G 027 (Father Immigrant): Question Wording “Is your father immigrant to 
this country or not?” Answers  0 NO, 1 YES :Source: the WVS 
X001(Sex): Question Wording “Sex” Answers 1 Male 2 Female Source: the 
WVS 
Appendix 2.2 (Inglehart) Distribution of the Population 
of the Countries 
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Appendix-Table 2. 1 (Inglehart) Distribution of the population of the countries 
in wave 3 among value types, % 
 
 
Country Value type 1 Value type 2 Value type 3
Albania 35.46 26.47 38.07
Azerbaijan 66.67 9.02 24.32
Argentina 47.68 13.77 38.55
Australia 28.05 46.86 25.10
Armenia 42.97 30.08 26.95
Bulgaria 18.94 56.38 24.68
Belarus 35.53 47.22 17.25
Chile 71.95 5.32 22.74
Croatia 29.75 37.59 32.65
Dominican Rep. 67.11 4.61 28.29
Estonia 16.10 70.73 13.17
Finland 27.77 39.83 32.40
Georgia 59.16 18.81 22.03
Germany 12.79 59.49 27.71
Hungary 25.38 53.01 21.62
India 74.18 14.61 11.22
Latvia 26.22 47.57 26.22
Lithuania 48.48 35.20 16.32
Mexico 64.29 12.43 23.28
Moldova 55.79 25.31 18.89
New Zealand 22.97 50.70 26.33
Nigeria 89.73 2.70 7.57
Norway 16.75 60.99 22.27
Peru 68.48 5.34 26.18
Philippines 70.61 2.17 27.22
Puerto Rico 79.04 2.07 18.90
Romania 46.40 18.69 34.91
Russia 30.96 53.64 15.40
Slovakia 27.05 35.52 37.42
Slovenia 27.14 51.22 21.64
South Africa 75.58 3.64 20.78
Spain 33.22 27.25 39.52
Sweden 4.58 71.04 24.38
Switzerland 19.61 38.64 41.75
Ukraine 37.80 45.54 16.67
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Notes: People classified as Value type 1 tend to abstain from petition and 
disapprove abortion. Individuals who do not show greater respect for 
authority and who trust others are classified as Value type 2. Individuals in 
Value type 3 tend to approve homosexuality and show greater national pride.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix-Table 2. 2 (Inglehart) Distribution of the population of the countries 
in wave 4 among value types, % 
 
 
Macedonia 34.99 45.11 19.90
United States 54.03 13.72 32.25
Uruguay 43.92 28.89 27.19
Venezuela 80.94 5.17 13.89
Serbia 28.04 53.89 18.07
Montenegro 45.26 38.69 16.06
Bosnia 56.09 21.29 22.61
Country Value type 1 Value type 2 Value type 3
Country Value type 1 Value type 2 Value type 3
Albania 54.72 24.65 20.63
Algeria 93.17 1.68 5.15
Argentina 58.20 10.73 31.06
Bangladesh 96.42 2.55 1.04
Bosnia 55.56 24.02 20.42
Canada 30.73 24.97 44.30
Chile 65.95 6.48 27.57
India 57.28 8.68 34.04
Indonesia 98.38 0.29 1.33
Israel 35.97 20.13 43.90
Japan 18.43 54.12 27.45
Jordan 97.89 0.00 2.11
South Korea 38.35 46.52 15.13
Kyrgyzstan 70.41 17.45 12.14
Mexico 61.99 3.62 34.39
Moldova 51.21 24.72 24.07
Nigeria 92.83 1.33 5.84
Pakistan 98.75 0.00 1.25
Peru 82.43 3.65 13.92
Philippines 61.42 2.43 36.14
Puerto Rico 74.84 1.42 23.73
Singapore 61.50 21.75 16.75
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Notes: People classified as Value type 1 tend to abstain from petition and 
disapprove abortion. Individuals who do not show greater respect for 
authority and who trust others are classified as Value type 2. Individuals in 
Value type 3 tend to approve homosexuality and show greater national pride.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix-Table 2. 3 (Inglehart) Distribution of the population of the countries 
in wave 5 among value types, % 
 
 
Viet Nam 49.34 45.26 5.39
South Africa 64.43 6.71 28.86
Zimbabwe 95.70 2.21 2.10
Spain 22.14 41.88 35.99
Sweden 5.16 66.92 27.92
Uganda 91.62 1.35 7.03
Macedonia 57.42 23.25 19.33
Egypt 94.21 0.59 5.20
Tanzania 94.97 2.83 2.20
United States 41.00 12.62 46.37
Venezuela 82.68 1.99 15.32
Serbia 39.45 41.95 18.60
Montenegro 52.63 28.95 18.42
Country Value type 1 Value type 2 Value type 3
Country Value type 1 Value type 2 Value type 3
Andorra 8.48 42.52 49.00
Argentina 45.57 11.71 42.71
Australia 20.65 41.15 38.19
Brazil 61.78 1.73 36.49
Bulgaria 21.64 44.96 33.40
Canada 29.17 25.39 45.44
Chile 50.43 9.62 39.95
China 31.01 66.20 2.79
Taiwan 39.67 34.85 25.48
Colombia 70.74 1.39 27.87
Cyprus 50.46 7.99 41.56
Ethiopia 89.28 2.74 7.98
Finland 17.37 39.84 42.79
France 11.63 58.48 29.89
Georgia 89.79 1.47 8.74
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Notes: People classified as Value type 1 tend to abstain from petition and 
disapprove abortion. Individuals who do not show greater respect for 
authority and who trust others are classified as Value type 2. Individuals in 
Value type 3 tend to approve homosexuality and show greater national pride.  
 
 
 
Germany 12.97 60.55 26.48
Ghana 87.83 0.30 11.87
Guatemala 74.95 0.94 24.11
Hungary 26.45 50.53 23.02
India 55.46 22.61 21.93
Indonesia 93.46 1.78 4.76
Italy 54.85 13.07 32.08
Japan 17.02 53.19 29.79
Jordan 99.02 0.36 0.63
South Korea 38.19 44.79 17.02
Malaysia 61.32 11.20 27.48
Mali 65.46 2.64 31.90
Mexico 52.05 3.58 44.37
Moldova 67.12 11.45 21.42
Netherlands 12.76 56.38 30.86
New Zealand 18.67 55.50 25.83
Norway 4.90 66.95 28.14
Poland 63.82 7.96 28.22
Romania 70.97 4.59 24.45
Russia 43.23 37.65 19.12
Rwanda 92.21 1.85 5.94
Viet Nam 43.21 49.15 7.64
Slovenia 17.95 48.63 33.42
Spain 16.79 46.46 36.75
Sweden 2.42 68.52 29.06
Thailand 73.80 3.60 22.59
Trinidad and Tobago 79.02 2.24 18.74
Turkey 82.88 2.74 14.39
Ukraine 48.22 21.15 30.63
Great Britain 20.21 49.87 29.92
United States 39.88 15.32 44.81
Burkina Faso 85.05 2.08 12.88
Uruguay 29.14 22.11 48.76
Serbia and Montenegro 30.34 18.45 51.21
Zambia 69.36 2.99 27.65
Country Value type 1 Value type 2 Value type 3
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Appendix-Table 2. 4 (Inglehart) Distribution of the population of the countries 
in wave 6 among value types, % 
 
Country Value type 1 Value type 2 Value type 3
Algeria 80.17 1.17 18.67
Azerbaijan 85.32 0.94 13.73
Australia 13.25 53.07 33.67
Armenia 87.10 6.80 6.10
Chile 42.61 9.23 48.15
China 23.17 71.01 5.81
Taiwan 30.04 35.80 34.17
Colombia 75.50 2.08 22.42
Cyprus 53.39 5.86 40.76
Ecuador 76.58 3.37 20.05
Estonia 18.68 63.44 17.89
Palestine 91.29 0.53 8.18
Germany 17.59 49.49 32.92
Ghana 95.10 0.26 4.65
Iraq 86.80 0.20 13.00
Japan 16.16 57.11 26.73
Kazakhstan 59.29 16.04 24.67
Jordan 94.67 1.05 4.28
South Korea 34.32 48.52 17.16
Kyrgyzstan 79.76 8.44 11.80
Lebanon 62.95 9.57 27.48
Libya 87.70 1.30 11.00
Malaysia 79.80 4.13 16.07
Mexico 58.87 4.25 36.88
Morocco 94.14 0.75 5.11
Netherlands 9.37 59.34 31.30
New Zealand 15.30 53.88 30.82
Nigeria 85.84 1.48 12.68
Pakistan 93.54 1.40 5.06
Peru 65.36 5.30 29.34
Philippines 54.70 2.99 42.31
Poland 59.59 14.76 25.66
Romania 70.76 6.75 22.49
Russia 43.18 28.06 28.76
Rwanda 87.84 9.73 2.43
Slovenia 14.02 55.67 30.31
Zimbabwe 84.39 1.01 14.60
Spain 13.10 53.56 33.33
Sweden 3.04 72.51 24.45
Trinidad and Tobago 86.65 1.64 11.71
Tunisia 92.21 0.44 7.34
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Notes: People classified as Value type 1 tend to abstain from petition and 
disapprove abortion. Individuals who do not show greater respect for 
authority and who trust others are classified as Value type 2. Individuals in 
Value type 3 tend to approve homosexuality and show greater national pride.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2.3 Value, Ethnic, Language, and Religious 
Fractionalization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turkey 86.74 1.66 11.60
Ukraine 51.54 20.98 27.47
United States 32.28 21.07 46.65
Uruguay 27.50 31.91 40.59
Yemen 87.55 1.29 11.16
Country Value type 1 Value type 2 Value type 3
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Appendix-Table 2. 5 Value, Ethnic, Language, and Religious fractionalization 
 
Country Value Frac. Ethnic Frac. Lnaguage Frac. Religious Frac.
Albania 0.65 0.22 0.04 0.47
Algeria 0.21 0.34 0.44 0.01
Andorra 0.57 0.71 0.68 0.23
Azerbaijan 0.41 0.20 0.21 0.49
Argentina 0.58 0.26 0.06 0.22
Australia 0.63 0.09 0.33 0.82
Bangladesh 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.21
Armenia 0.56 0.13 0.13 0.46
Brazil 0.44 0.54 0.05 0.61
Bulgaria 0.62 0.40 0.30 0.60
Belarus 0.58 0.32 0.47 0.61
Canada 0.65 0.71 0.58 0.70
Chile 0.49 0.19 0.19 0.38
China 0.45 0.15 0.13 0.66
Taiwan 0.66 0.27 0.50 0.68
Colombia 0.41 0.60 0.02 0.15
Croatia 0.66 0.37 0.08 0.44
Cyprus 0.56 0.09 0.40 0.40
Dominican Rep. 0.47 0.43 0.04 0.31
Ecuador 0.37 0.66 0.13 0.14
Ethiopia 0.20 0.72 0.81 0.62
Estonia 0.51 0.51 0.49 0.50
Finland 0.65 0.13 0.14 0.25
France 0.56 0.10 0.12 0.40
Georgia 0.45 0.49 0.47 0.65
Germany 0.58 0.17 0.16 0.66
Ghana 0.15 0.67 0.67 0.80
Guatemala 0.38 0.51 0.46 0.38
Hungary 0.62 0.15 0.03 0.52
India 0.51 0.42 0.81 0.33
Indonesia 0.09 0.74 0.77 0.23
Iraq 0.23 0.37 0.37 0.48
Israel 0.64 0.34 0.55 0.35
Italy 0.58 0.11 0.11 0.30
Japan 0.60 0.01 0.02 0.54
Kazakhstan 0.56 0.62 0.66 0.59
Jordan 0.06 0.59 0.04 0.07
South Korea 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.66
Kyrgyzstan 0.40 0.68 0.59 0.45
Lebanon 0.52 0.13 0.13 0.79
Latvia 0.64 0.59 0.58 0.56
Libya 0.22 0.79 0.08 0.06
Lithuania 0.61 0.32 0.32 0.41
Malaysia 0.44 0.59 0.60 0.67
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Notes: Value frac; Abbreviation of value fractionalization index, Ethnic frac; 
Abbreviation of ethnic fractionalization index; Source Alesina et al. 
(2003)Langue frac; Abbreviation of language fractionalization index; Source 
Alesina et al. (2003) Religious frac; Abbreviation of religious fractionalization 
index; Source Alesina et al. (2003) 
Mali 0.47 0.69 0.84 0.18
Mexico 0.51 0.54 0.15 0.18
Moldova 0.57 0.55 0.55 0.56
Morocco 0.11 0.48 0.47 0.00
Netherlands 0.55 0.11 0.51 0.72
New Zealand 0.61 0.40 0.17 0.81
Nigeria 0.21 0.85 0.85 0.74
Norway 0.52 0.06 0.07 0.20
Pakistan 0.07 0.71 0.72 0.38
Peru 0.41 0.66 0.34 0.20
Philippines 0.49 0.24 0.84 0.31
Poland 0.53 0.12 0.05 0.17
Puerto Rico 0.36 0.04 0.50
Romania 0.51 0.31 0.17 0.24
Russia 0.63 0.25 0.25 0.44
Rwanda 0.19 0.32 0.51
Singapore 0.55 0.39 0.38 0.66
Slovakia 0.66 0.25 0.26 0.57
Viet Nam 0.56 0.24 0.24 0.51
Slovenia 0.61 0.22 0.22 0.29
South Africa 0.44 0.75 0.87 0.86
Zimbabwe 0.21 0.39 0.45 0.74
Spain 0.65 0.42 0.41 0.45
Sweden 0.45 0.06 0.20 0.23
Switzerland 0.64 0.53 0.54 0.61
Thailand 0.40 0.63 0.63 0.10
Trinidad and Tobago 0.29 0.65 0.13 0.79
Tunisia 0.14 0.04 0.01 0.01
Turkey 0.36 0.32 0.22 0.00
Uganda 0.16 0.93 0.92 0.63
Ukraine 0.64 0.47 0.47 0.62
Macedonia 0.63 0.50 0.50 0.59
Egypt 0.11 0.18 0.02 0.20
Great Britain 0.62 0.12 0.05 0.69
Tanzania 0.10 0.74 0.90 0.63
United States 0.62 0.49 0.25 0.82
Burkina Faso 0.26 0.74 0.72 0.58
Uruguay 0.66 0.25 0.08 0.35
Venezuela 0.31 0.50 0.07 0.14
Yemen 0.22 0.01 0.00
Zambia 0.44 0.78 0.87 0.74
Country Value Frac. Ethnic Frac. Lnaguage Frac. Religious Frac.
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Appendix 2.4 Ten Items from Cultural Framework by 
Inglehart 
 
Ten Items for Inglehart’s Dimensions  
Source: World Values Surveys Wave 3 (1995-1998), Wave4 (1999-2004), Wave 
5 (2005-2009) and Wave 6 (2010-2014).  
Importance of God : 
Question wording: “How important is God in your life? Please use this scale 
to indicate where 10 means very important and 1 means not at all important.”  
Individual-level data is used and it takes discrete number from 1 to 10. Larger 
numbers indicate a higher degree of importance. 
 
Teach Children Obedience and Faith rather than Independence and 
Determination (Autonomy index) : 
Question wording: “Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged 
to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? 
Please choose up to five.”  
The list of qualities we used contains the following; “obedience,” “religious 
faith,” “independence,” and “determination, perseverance.”  
We coded each of the above-mentioned qualities 1 if chosen and 0 if not 
chosen. Then we calculated the following index: 
Autonomy index
= Obedience + Religious faith − Independence
− Determination, Preseverance 
This index is called autonomy index (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). The index 
ranges from –2 to +2. Thus, an individual who chose both independence and 
determination but neither obedience nor religious faith has score -2. On the 
other hand, it scores +2 if an individual chose both obedience and religious 
faith but neither independence nor determination.  
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Disapproval of Abortion : 
Question wording: “Please tell me for each of the following statements 
whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something 
in between, using this card.”  
The card provides discrete numbers from 1 to 10. 1 means “never justifiable” 
and 10 means “always justifiable.” Statement is “abortion.” Thus, this 
number shows the degree of approval of abortion and it provides discrete 
numbers from 1 to 10 with larger numbers indicating a higher degree of 
approval. We reversed this scale so that larger numbers indicate a higher 
degree of disapproval of abortion. 
National Pride : 
Question wording: “How proud are you to be [nationality]?”  
It is required to answer the question from the following options. 1 “very 
proud”, 2 “quite proud”, 3 “not very proud”, and 4 “not at all proud.” 
This paper reversed this scale. Therefore, larger numbers indicate a stronger 
degree of national pride. 
 
Respect for Authority : 
Question wording: “I'm going to read out a list of various changes in our way 
of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, 
if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, 
or don't you mind?”  
The list we use is “greater respect for authority.” We coded individuals 1 if 
they showed greater respect for authority to be a good thing and 0 otherwise.  
 
Priority for Economic and Physical Security (Materialist Values) : 
Question wording:  
The first question is “People sometimes talk about what the aims of this 
country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the 
goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say 
60 
 
60 
 
which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important?” and the next 
question is: “And which would be the next most important?”  
The options include the followings: “Maintaining order in the nation,” “giving 
people more say in important government decisions,” “fighting rising prices” 
and “protecting freedom of speech.”  
We coded each of “maintaining order in the nation” and “fighting rising prices” 
1 if chosen in first or second choice and 0 if not chosen. We added them and 
calculate so-called Materialist values which ranges from 0 to 2 (Inglehart and 
Baker, 2000).  An individual who chose both “maintaining order in the nation” 
and “fighting rising prices” has score 2 which means strong priority for 
materialistic goals.  
 
Feeling of Unhappiness: 
Question wording: “Taking all things together, would you say you are: 1 Very 
happy, 2 quite happy, 3 not very happy, 4 not at all happy.”  
It measures the degree of unhappiness. Larger numbers indicate a higher 
degree of unhappiness. 
 
Disapproval of Homosexuality : 
Question wording: “Please tell me for each of the following statements 
whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something 
in between, using this card.”  
The card provides discrete numbers from 1 to 10. 1 means “never justifiable” 
and 10 means “always justifiable Statement is “homosexuality.” Therefore, 
it indicates the degree of acceptance of homosexuality. We reversed this 
scale so that larger numbers indicate a higher degree of disapproval of 
homosexuality. 
 
 
Abstaining from Signing Petitions: 
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Question wording: “Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out 
some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you 
to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, 
whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.”  
Individuals who answered “have done” or “might do” are coded 0. Other 
individuals are coded 1. Hence, 1 indicates abstaining from signing petitions.  
 
Distrusting in Other People: 
Question wording: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can 
be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?: 1 Most 
people can be trusted, 2 need to be very careful.”  
Individuals are coded 1 if they answered “need to be very careful” and 0 
otherwise. Thus, this measure indicates how people distrusting in other 
people. 
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Appendix 2.5 Map of Countries (Inglehart) 
 
 
Appendix-Figure 2. 1 Map of Countries (Wave 5, 2008) 
Source: Inglehart and Welzel (2010), "Changing Mass Priorities: The Link 
Between Modernization and Democracy." Perspectives on Politics (vol. 8, No. 
2) page 554. 
 
 
Appendix-Table 2. 6 Correlation matrix of value, ethnic, language and 
religious fractionalization indices 
 
NOTES: *<.05 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4
1 Value fractioinalization 1
2 Ethnic fractionalization -0.39* 1
3 Language fractionalization -0.19 0.65* 1
4 Religious fractionalization 0.29* 0.10 0.30 1
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Chapter Three: 
Institutions and Economic 
Performance: Revisiting the 
Relationship 
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Chapter Overview 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite the seminal article Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (AJR) (2001) and 
several recent papers, there is still little consensus on the role of institutions in 
economic development given that endogeneity concerns and use of appropriate 
instruments still plague the causal relationship. We revisit the existing theory, 
challenge the instrumental variables used, and seek alternative ways of 
investigating the impact of institutions on economic performance. Using a new 
measure of cultural diversity that we proposed in chapter 2 as instrument, we 
improve upon previous studies in showing that the quality of institution plays an 
important role in economic development, providing robust empirical 
underpinnings to AJR theoretical hypothesis. 
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A seminal article, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), henceforth AJR 
(2001), investigates the causal effect of institutions, measured by protection 
against the risk of expropriation, on economic performance across previously 
colonized countries. They argue that colonization strategy was affected by the 
feasibility of settlement and this strategy determined the quality of institutions. 
Exploiting the variations in European settler mortality rates as an instrument they 
show that quality of institutions cause economic development. The central idea 
of AJR (2001) has been adopted to many other papers (Rodrik et al., 2004; Tabellini, 
2010; Acemoglu et al., 2014). On the other hand, validity of using settler mortality 
rates as instruments for institutions has been widely debated (AJR, 2001; AJR, 
2012; Acemoglu et al., 2014; Albouy, 2012; Glaeser et al., 2004; Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou, 2014). For instance, Albouy (2012) points out that it is not 
appropriate to use the AJR (2001) mortality series in the analysis because of data 
problems. However, AJR (2012) shows that the results in AJR (2001) are robust 
using an alternative instrument called capped potential settler mortality27. This 
debate largely stems from the quality of historical data and given the limited data 
sources currently available, instruments based on historical data remain a key 
concern. Hence, to overcome the measurement issues with historical data, we 
exploit the existing diversity in human values across and within countries to 
disentangle the effect of current institutions on economic performance. The 
results presented using a new and robust measure of cultural diversity provide the 
vital empirical basis to the AJR theoretical hypothesis. 
Our plan is first to revisit the basic theory constructed by the existing studies 
and then to seek alternative ways of investigating the impact of institutions on 
economic performance. Using the widely used World Values Survey (WVS) we 
construct the novel measure of cultural diversity – index of value fractionalization  
                                                   
27 Settler mortality capped at 250 per 1000 per annum is used to reduce the impact of high 
mortality outliers. AJR (2012) argues that capping extreme values is a widely used strategy for 
dealing with outliers and potentially contaminated data.  
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to reflect the diversity in human values within a country. Exploiting the cross-
country variation in this index as an instrument for the quality of institutions we 
estimate the impact of institutions on economic performance. 
  Our theory is based on two grounds. Firstly, we hypothesize that value 
fractionalization affects institutional quality. 28  Our intuition is that in the 
countries that are highly fragmented with regard to human values it is more 
difficult to agree on the form of the institutions and by necessity these institutions 
are rather more complicated. 29  Secondly, we demonstrate that value 
fractionalization has no direct impact on economic performance30.  
  In practice it is often difficult to find convincing instruments. Our second theory 
is mainly supported by the followings. There is no evidence that value 
fractionalization impacts economic performance directly. Further, many studies 
examine the role of institutions on economic performance using cultural diversity 
measure as instruments for the quality of institutions. Finally, unlike observable 
heterogeneity in a society (e.g. heterogeneity in ethnicity, language), it is difficult 
for people to grasp value fractionalization in a country so that it is natural to 
assume that people do not take hidden heterogeneity into account when they 
make economic decision. 
  Our approach draws from Mauro (1995) and other articles that estimates the 
impact of institutions on economic performance using more conventional cultural 
diversity measure as instruments for the quality of institutions in IV estimation.31 
                                                   
28 It does not mean institutional quality is determined only by diversity in 
peoples’ values, but value fractionalization seems to be one of the factors that 
have an impact on current institutional quality. 
29 For instance, in some countries like Lebanon that have a lot of ethnic and 
religious division complicated mechanisms exist to counterbalance 
representation of various groups in the power. In a similar way any significant 
diversity within a country in human values may also require more complicated 
institutions. A need for more complicated institutions puts more constraints on 
the government and thus may affect institutional quality. 
30 Section 4.4.3 for results. 
31 Ethno-linguistic fractionalization is used as an instrument in Mauro (1995). This 
approach has been adopted by many other articles. For instance, Méon and Sekkat 
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However we differ from these studies by focusing directly on “internal traits” such 
as belief and human values in comparison to previously used “external traits” such 
as ethnicity and language.32    
Here we first perform OLS and regress GDP per capita on institutions (rule of 
law index from World Bank). We find a strong link between economic performance 
and institutions. Then, institutions are instrumented using value fractionalization. 
By IV regressions, we observe the strong impact of institutions on economic 
performance.  
  One of the objectives of this chapter is to develop a new approach that allows 
us to check the robustness of the results on the role of institutions in economic 
performance derived by AJR (2001) and Acemoglu et al. (2014). An improvement 
in the robustness is attained with the use of value fractionalization as instruments 
for institutions instead of settler mortality. There are several further advantages 
to our approach. The use of value fractionalization (i) enables us to overcome 
concerns about the quality of historical data and mitigates the risk of reverse 
causality that settler mortality affects current economic performance not only 
through institutional development but also thorough past economic performance 
and (ii) improves the robustness of the results by including countries that have 
been less affected by Europeans. Although many researchers have empirically 
shown that colonial experience plays an important role in institutions, it is difficult 
to explain the variation in current economic performance among countries that 
had never been colonized by the Europeans. Since our premises are not based on 
colonial policy we are able to investigate the role of institutions in economic 
                                                   
(2008) estimate the impact of institutions (e.g. the rule of law index) on economic 
performance (e.g. exports of manufactured goods) using ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization as an instrument for institutions. Further, the relationship 
between institutional quality and exports is examined by Faruq (2011). IV 
estimation is adopted and ethno-linguistic fractionalization is used as an 
instrument for institutional quality. 
32 Religion is not a perfect measure of internal traits either. Vast majority of 
people our days stay in the religion they were born to. 
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performance for countries that are not so much influenced by European countries. 
Results presented show a significant impact of institutions on economic 
performance not only for ex-colonies but also for countries less affected by the 
Europeans.  
   In order to evaluate the robustness of our approach, we first add several 
widely used control variables and show that our results are robust to the inclusion 
of these variables. We then investigate the validity of our approach using value 
fractionalization as an exogenous variable in AJR (2001) model. The results suggest 
that value fractionalization has no direct impact on GDP per capita and this 
supports our approach. Moreover, estimation using panel dataset also supports our 
main findings. Finally, this chapter constructs value fractionalization measures 
based on different definitions and concludes that our results do not change a lot 
by using these value fractionalization measures. Overall, our estimates indicate 
that an improvement in institutional quality leads to economic development. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 examines the 
existing theory. Section 3.2 describes the definition of value fractionalization. In 
section 3.3, we present our main results. Section 3.4 investigates the robustness 
of our main results and section 3.5 summarizes this study and provides concluding 
remarks. 
 
3.1. Examining the Existing Theory 
 
A considerable amount of literature has been published on the impact of 
institutions on economic performance. AJR (2001) investigates the causal effect 
of institutions and argues that, during the colonial era, Europeans were more likely 
to settle in regions where the risk of getting disease was lower. In colonies where 
Europeans settled, they established efficient institutions with better protection 
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of property rights in comparison to colonies with no large settlement. Hence, 
where the Europeans settled, they created better institutions with respect to 
protection of property rights than in colonies where they did not settle.  
In order to examine the relationship between institutions and economic 
performance, AJR (2001) uses an instrumental-variables approach for countries 
that were ex-colonies. A potential European settler mortality rates is used as an 
instrument for the protection against expropriation risk. According to AJR (2001), 
the reason for using the instrument is that the European settler mortality rates 
more than 100 years ago have no direct impact on current GDP per capita. However, 
it has the indirect effect on current GDP per capita through development of 
institutions. 
  Basic theory used in AJR (2001, 2012) and Acemoglu et al. (2014) is that 
Europeans determined whether they settle or not by (potential) settler mortality 
rates and their settlement in the colonies was a key determinant of early 
institutions. After the creation of early institutions, they have persisted and affect 
the feature of current institutions. This relationship has been applied to many 
other articles (Rodrik et al. 2004; Tabellini, 2010; AJR, 2012; Acemoglu et al. 2014) 
and it is summarized using relationships (1) and (2) in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3. 1 Early institutions, current institutions and current economic 
performance 
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Figure 3. 2 Early institutions, early economic performance and current economic 
performance 
 
 
  It is however not unlikely that early institutions affect early economic 
performance (relationship 3 in Figure 3.2) which in turn may have consequence 
for current economic performance (relationship 4 in Figure 3.2). A number of 
papers found the causal relationship between institutions and economic 
performance (AJR, 2001; Mauro, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 
2014). They show that efficient institutions cause economic development so that 
it is natural to assume that this relationship is also true in the past (relationship 3 
in Figure 3.2). We now empirically examine if the relationships are true using an 
index constraint on executive in 1900 to represent early institutions33. Figure 3.3 
presents simple plots of early institutions and early economic performance for a 
sample of 15 countries (Data Source: AJR (2001) and The Maddison-Project). We 
find a significant positive correlation between log of GDP per capita in 1900 and 
constraint on executive in 1900 (r = 0.68, p <0.01). 
 
 
 
                                                   
33 Constraints faced by the executive in 1900 is used to represent early institutions in AJR 
(2001). A higher score indicating more constraints. 
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Figure 3. 3 The relationship between early institutions and early economic 
performance (relationship 3) 
Notes: The Vertical Axis Log GDP per capita in 1900; The Horizontal Axis Constraint on Executive 
in 1900. Linear prediction is shown in the figure. 
 
 
 
  Next in Figure 3.4 we plot the relationship between the log of settler mortality 
and the log of GDP per capita in 1900 for a sample of 18 countries. There is a 
significant negative correlation between log of settler mortality and log of GDP 
per capita in 1900 (r = -0.76, p < 0.01) showing that there is a significant 
correlation between the instrument used in AJR (2001) and early economic 
performance. Both Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 together suggest that relationship (3) 
in Figure 3.2 is indeed true. 
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Figure 3. 4 The relationship between early economic performance and settler 
mortality 
Notes: The Vertical Axis Log GDP per capita in 1900; The Horizontal Axis log settler mortality. Linear 
prediction is shown in the figure. 
 
  We now turn to see the relationship between early economic performance and 
current economic performance (relationship 4 in Figure 3.2). Figure 3.5 plots the 
log of GDP per capita in 2000 against the log of GDP per capita in 1900 in the whole 
world sample (Data Source: The Maddison-Project). There is a significant positive 
correlation between log of GDP per capita in 2000 and log of GDP per capita in 
1900 (r = 0.81, p < 0.01). Similar relationship is found for a sample of ex-colonies 
(Appendix-Figure 3.1, r = 0.87, p < 0.01). These figures indicate that early 
economic performance tended to persist and relationship 4 in Figure 3.2 seems to 
be true. Given that settler mortality rate seems to affect current economic 
performance via channels other than current institutions, the use of settler 
mortality rate as an instrument is somewhat unconvincing. 
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Figure 3. 5 The relationship between early economic performance and current 
economic performance 
Notes: The Vertical Axis Log GDP per capita in 2000; The Horizontal Axis Log GDP 
per capita in 1900. Linear prediction is shown in the figure. 
 
Though many papers following AJR (2001) and use historical variables as 
instruments for institutions, our observations indicate that using historical 
variables as instruments for current institutions may lead to misleading 
conclusions because historical variables may affect past economic performance 
via past institutions34.  
 
 
3.2 Value Fractionalization: Cultural 
Diversity based on Human Values 
 
As discussed in previous section, this chapter aims to find alternative 
instruments for institutions that are not historical variables to revisit the 
relationship between institutions and economic performance. As a candidate for 
                                                   
34 Hall and Jones (1999) propose latitude as an instrument for Western influence. But Western 
influence also seems to affect current economic performance thorough channels other than 
current institutions. 
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instrument for institutions, the chapter proposes “value fractionalization” that 
captures diversity of human values within a country. In this section, we discuss 
and define value fractionalization.  
   Value fractionalization enables us to address some shortcomings of previous 
studies. Firstly, value fractionalization captures a new aspect of cultural diversity. 
A considerable amount of literature has been published on the role of cultural 
diversity in economic performance (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). However, 
previous studies on cultural diversity mainly focus on diversity of ethnicity, 
religion and language that are rather “external traits”. There has been little 
discussion on the impact of diversity of human values and accounting for it can 
be beneficial. 
Secondly, the introduction of value fractionalization may solve some problems 
of using ethnicity, religion and language as a measure of cultural diversity. The 
absence of a uniform criterion to define ethnicity is problematic (Fish and Brooks, 
2004). Moreover, for instance, a person who can speak more than one language 
fluently finds it difficult to identify her native language. Further, some people 
have more than one religion. According to the CIA World Fact Book, 83.9 percent 
of Japanese are classified as Shintoism, 71.4 percent as Buddhism, 2 percent as 
Christianity, and 7.8 percent as others. Total exceeds 100 percent because many 
Japanese belong to both Shintoism and Buddhism (CIA Fact Book). This is 
problematic because standard cultural diversity measure assumes that the total 
is 100 percent. By contrast, in order to calculate value fractionalization, all 
individuals are divided into groups that share similar thoughts so that the total is 
always 100 percent.  
The use of value fractionalization instead of historical variables also has its 
problems, but it avoids criticism applied to previous literature. Therefore, our 
approach plays a complementary role. In addition to this role, it enables us to 
examine the impact of institutions not only for ex-colonies but also for countries 
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that are less affected by European countries35 . Further, it also allows us to 
address diversity in internal traits which is interesting in its own. 
Following the literature on cultural diversity (e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; 
Easterly and Levine, 1997; Fearon, 2003), our value fractionalization index 
measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a society are 
from different cultural groups and it is calculated as follows:  
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ≡ 1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Where the population shares of the cultural groups in a society are denoted 
as 𝑝1, 𝑝2, .. , 𝑝𝑛 and 𝑛, is the number of cultural groups. 
This index takes values from 0 to 1 and it is maximized when every individual 
in a society belongs to different cultural group.  
   World Values Survey (WVS) is then used to construct cultural groups based on 
values. The way of creating value fractionalization index is the same as chapter 
2. Firstly, we select some survey questions which are important dimensions of 
human values. Secondly, individuals who made similar responses are classified 
into the same group. We call this group “value type”. Finally, we derive value 
fractionalization index from the population shares of the value types in a country. 
In order to find important questions from WVS, this chapter follows Inglehart’s 
approach to human values. Ten items36 that Inglehart and Baker (2000) and 
Inglehart and Welzel (2005) used are shown in Appendix 3.1. 
We use the third round to the sixth round of WVS data, which were collected in 
1994–2014: Wave 3 (1994-1998), Wave 4 (1999-2004), Wave 5 (2005-2009) and 
Wave 6 (2010-2014). The reason why we excluded Wave 1 and Wave 2 is that these 
waves are weighted with advanced economies. We used data from 90 cultural 
groups. The sample sizes differ between cultural groups. In contrast to ethnicity, 
                                                   
35 This chapter does not use colonial policy so that we can examine the role of 
institutions in economic performance for non-excolonies. 
36 Survey questions are shown in Appendix and ten Items for Inglehart’s 
Dimensions are summarize in table 2.2 
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language, and religion there are no pre-determined groupings for human values. 
This chapter also uses k-means cluster analysis in order to classify respondents 
into three groups37. By this grouping method, individuals in the same group (value 
type) share common characteristics38 . Cluster analysis tells us the population 
shares of the value types in a society so that we can calculate value 
fractionalization index. Value fractionalization is maximized when every individual 
in a society belongs to different value type. Hence, individuals in a society with 
low value fractionalization score tend to share common values39. 
As previously mentioned, value fractionalization can be a key determinant of 
institutional quality. Figure 3.6 shows the relationship between value 
fractionalization and the rule of law index in 2010 for 35 countries that are 
included in both WVS and AJR (2001). A positive and linear relationship is found in 
the figure (r = 0.64, p < 0.01)40. Rodrik et al. (2004) and Acemoglu et al (2014) 
argue that the rule of law index has positive impact on economic performance. 
These facts and our assumption that value fractionalization has effect on 
institutions, but does not have a direct impact on economic performance suggest 
that value fractionalization can be a candidate for an instrument for institutions. 
Finally, Figure 3.7 shows the positive relationship between the rule of law index 
in 2010 and log GDP per capita in 2010. We examine this relationship in the next 
section. 
                                                   
37 In section 3.4.4, we consider whether our main results are robust to grouping 
individuals into 4-10 groups. 
38 Individuals classified as value type 1, compared with other value types, tend 
to abstain from petition and disapprove abortion. Many individuals in Jordan and 
Libya are classified as value type 1. Value type 2 mainly consists with people 
who do not show greater respect for authority and people who trust others 
compared with other value types. The respondents in Sweden and Norway tend 
to have this value type. Individuals classified as value type 3 have a tendency to 
approve homosexuality and show greater national pride. USA and Canada have 
many value type3 individuals. 
39 Appendix-Table 3.1 shows the countries with high value fractionalization index 
and low value fractionalization index. 
40 This will be our first stage for our main two stage least squares estimates. 
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Figure 3. 6 Value fractionalization and the rule of law index in 2010 (35 countries 
that are included in both WVS and AJR, 2001) 
Notes: Linear prediction is shown in the figure.
 
Figure 3. 7 The relationship between the rule of law index in 2010 and log GDP 
per capita in 2010 (Full sample) 
Notes: The Vertical Axis Log GDP per capita in 2010; The Horizontal Axis Rule of 
law index. Linear prediction is shown in the figure. 
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3.3 Institutions and Performance 
 
3.3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Our main measure of institutions is the rule of law index for 2010 from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) constructed by the World Bank. This 
measure is used in Rodrik et al. (2004) and Acemoglu et al. (2014). According to 
Rodrick et al. (2004), the advantage of using the rule of law as an index of 
institutional quality is that it is available for many countries, and this index 
“captures more elements that go toward determining institutional quality.” 
Further, Acemoglu et al. (2014) use the rule of law index because this measure 
provides “the most up-to date measure of broad institutions.” “The rule of law 
index captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence (Kaufmann et al. 2013)”. This measure ranges from approximately -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. 
  Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for the key variables. The first column 
is for the full sample included in WVS. 35 countries are common in both WVS 
(waves 3 to 6) data and AJR (2001) data. Thus, we call this sample “base sample” 
41. The third column is for the countries that were ex-colonies. Ex-colony is a 
sample of 40 countries that were ex-colonies. Libya, Philippines, Rwanda, 
Zimbabwe, and Zambia are included in Ex-colonies and not included in base 
sample. GDP per capita in 2010 is our measure of current economic performance 
as reported in Penn World table. In our base sample of 35 countries, the richest 
                                                   
41 We use base sample because this chapter first revisits the relationship 
between institutions and economic performance shown in AJR (2001). 
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country is Singapore and the poorest country is Ethiopia. The mean log GDP per 
capita in the full sample is 9.08 and that in base sample is 8.71. In our base sample 
of 35 countries, the mean score of the rule of law is -0.08. Zimbabwe (score of -
1.81) has the weakest institutions and New Zealand (score of 1.86) has the 
strongest institutions. 
 
Table 3. 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Notes: There are three samples: (1) Full sample, (2) base sample (sample of 35 
countries included in both WVS waves 3-6 and AJR 2001), (3) 40 countries that are 
Ex-colonies. Standard deviations are reported below the means. GDP per capita in 
2010 Source: Penn World Table; Latitude is absolute value of the latitude of the 
country (distance from the equator). It ranges from 0 and 1 and 0 is the equator. 
Source: CIA Fact Book and La Porta et al. (1999); Rule of law ranges between -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance; Value fractionalization ranges 
from 0 and 0.67 and is minimized when every individual in a society shares similar 
human values. Appendix 3.1describes the data and its sources. 
 
 
3.3.2 Ordinary Least-Squares Regressions 
 
  Table 3.2 reports ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions of log GDP per capita 
on the rule of law index in variety of samples. The estimation is done for five 
groups of countries: (1) for the full 84 countries that are available in WVS and 
Full sample (84 countries) Base sample (35 countries) Ex-colonies (40 countries)
9.08 8.71 8.57
(1.16) (1.19) (1.27)
0.12 -0.08 -0.17
(1.00) (0.94) (0.93)
0.35 0.21 0.21
(0.19) (0.15) (0.15)
0.45 0.36 0.44
(0.18) (0.19) (0.17)
log GDP per capita in 2010
Rule of Law
Latitude
value fractionalization
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Penn World table (2) for the countries that were colonized42  (3) for the sample 
of 35 countries that are included in both WVS and AJR (2001) (4) for the base 
sample of 27 countries without Africa 43  and (5) for the full sample without 
Europe44.  
Column (1) shows the strong relationship between the rule of law and log GDP 
per capita in the full sample. In column (2), latitude is included as an independent 
variable following AJR (2001) and Acemoglu et al. (2014). The OLS estimate of the 
impact of institutions on log of GDP per capita is 0.8445 without control variables 
and 0.71 with latitude. In columns (7) and (8), this study shows that our results 
are robust to dropping African countries from our base sample. Inclusion of 
latitude decreases the coefficient of institutions for the full sample, base sample, 
ex-colonies and the full sample without Europe. However, it increases the 
coefficient of the rule of law index if we limit the sample to base sample without 
Africa. Further, the coefficient of latitude is insignificant in columns (4), (6), (8), 
and (10).  
  One of the differences between our models and models in AJR (2001) and 
Acemoglu et al. (2014) is that our theory enables us to see the effect of institutions 
for the countries that are less affected by European countries. Table 3.2 indicates 
that the relationship between institutional quality and economic performance is 
similar in ex-colonies and the countries that are less influenced by Europe. 
  Overall, the results in Table 3.2 show a close relationship between institutional 
quality measured by the rule of law index and economic performance. However, 
as argued in AJR (2001) and many other papers, there are several reasons for not 
interpreting this relationship as causal and accurate. This is mainly because of 
                                                   
42 Ex-colony is used to extend AJR sample. 
43 By following AJR (2001), we also use base sample without Africa. 
44 We only have 9 countries that had never been colonized and non-European countries. 
Therefore, we use the full sample without Europe to see the impact of institutions for countries 
that are less affected by Europe. 
45 Table 2 of Acemoglu et al. (2014) reports OLS regressions of log GDP per capita in 2005 on the 
rule of law index using a sample of 62 countries that are former colonies. They also find a 
significant relationship with a coefficient of 0.93. 
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reverse causality, omitted variables bias and measurement error. In order to solve 
these problems, AJR (2001), Rodrik et al. (2004), and Acemoglu et al. (2014) use 
an instrumental-variables approach. By following these studies, the instrumental-
variables approach is employed in our chapter to demonstrate that the 
relationship shown in this section is not a simple correlation but a causal 
relationship. In the next subsections, this chapter exploits an IV approach and 
argues that value fractionalization is a plausible instrument for institutions. 
 
 
Table 3. 2 OLS Regressions of log GDP per capita 
 
Notes: OLS regressions with one observation per country. Dependent variable is 
log GDP per capita in 2010 Source: Penn World Table; Standard errors in 
parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; There are five samples: (1) full sample, 
(2) 40 countries that are Ex-colonies, (3) base sample (sample of 35 countries 
included in both WVS waves 3-6 and AJR 2001), (4) Base sample without Africa, 
and (5) full sample without Europe. Latitude is absolute value of the latitude of 
the country (distance from the equator). It ranges from 0 and 1 and 0 is the equator. 
Source: CIA Fact Book and La Porta et al. (1999); Rule of Law (in 2010) ranges 
between -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. See Appendix 3.1 
for more details. 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Rule of Law 0.84*** 0.71*** 0.86*** 0.78*** 0.81*** 0.76*** 0.66*** 0.74*** 0.88*** 0.78***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.20) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
Latitude 1.48*** 1.10 0.66 -1.13 1.52
(0.49) (1.22) (1.21) (0.94) (1.00)
R-squared 0.53 0.58 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.51 0.53 0.44 0.47
Number of observations 84 84 40 40 35 35 27 27 51 51
Full sample Ex-colonies Base sample
Base sample 
without Africa
Full sample without 
Europe
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2010
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3.3.3 IV Results 
     
In table 3.3, we report models in which the rule of law index is treated as 
endogenous. The exclusion restriction for our instrumental variables regression is 
that value fractionalization has no direct impact on log GDP per capita, other than 
its effect through the rule of law index. Panel A of table 3.3 shows the two-stage 
least squares estimates using value fractionalization as an instrument for the rule 
of law index. Panel B of the table reports the first stage relationship between 
institutions and our instrument value fractionalization. To see whether our 
instrument suffers from the presence of weak instrument, we check the F-
statistics for the first stage regressions and find that the F-statistics for the first 
stage regressions exceed 10 (as proposed by Staiger and Stock 1997).  
  In Column (1), the impact of institutions on log of GDP per capita is 1.47. This 
is highly significant and larger than that of the OLS estimates reported in table 
3.2 (0.84). 2SLS results in AJR (2001) and Acemoglu et al. (2014) also show that 
the coefficient on institutions is larger than that of OLS estimate. In all models, 
we observe that the coefficients for the rule of law index in the IV estimations are 
larger than that in the corresponding OLS estimations. 
  Latitude is added in the second column and this does not change the link 
between the rule of law index and log GDP per capita. However, the coefficient 
on institutions increases from 1.47 to 1.64. The coefficient on latitude is negative 
and insignificant. This is also seen in columns (2), (4), (6), (10) and AJR (2001). 
Columns (7) and (8) show that our results are robust to dropping Africa from base 
sample. The coefficient of institutions is smaller without Africa and this is also 
observed in AJR (2001). Columns (9) and (10) report that the impact of institutions 
on economic performance does not change for the countries that are less 
influenced by European culture. This suggests that value fractionalization enables 
us to estimate the impact of institutional quality on economic development not 
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only for ex-colonies but also for countries that are less affected by European 
countries. In addition, columns (1) and (2) imply that value fractionalization can 
be used as an instrument for institutions not only for ex-colonies but also for the 
full sample.  
As a whole, table 3.3 shows that institutions have positive impact on economic 
performance and value fractionalization seems to be a plausible instrument for 
institutions. The next section argues the robustness of the results obtained in this 
section. 
 
Table 3. 3 IV Regressions of log GDP per capita 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Dependent 
variable is log GDP per capita Source: Penn World Table; Latitude is absolute value 
of the latitude of the country (distance from the equator). It ranges from 0 and 1 
and 0 is the equator. Source: CIA Fact Book and La Porta et al. (1999); Rule of law 
ranges between -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance value 
fractionalization ranges from 0 and 0.67 and is minimized when every individual 
in a society shares similar human values. Panel A reports the two stage-least 
squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 2010 as the dependent variable and 
Rule of Law is instrumented using value fractionalization. Panel B reports the 
corresponding first stage. See Appendix 3.1 for more details. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Rule of Law 1.47*** 1.64*** 1.48*** 1.59*** 1.50*** 1.72*** 1.11*** 1.25*** 1.49*** 1.54***
(0.21) (0.40) (0.35) (0.46) (0.36) (0.51) (0.27) (0.31) (0.28) (0.36)
Latitude -0.78 -1.20 -2.25 -2.66** -0.56
(1.16) (1.82) (2.03) (1.34) (1.46)
value fractionalization 2.83*** 2.02*** 2.79*** 2.30*** 2.75*** 2.20*** 2.96*** 2.58*** 2.85*** 2.43***
(0.51) (0.61) (0.67) (0.67) (0.69) (0.69) (0.86) (0.81) (0.57) (0.59)
Latitude 1.32** 1.91** 2.08** 2.39** 1.63*
(0.58) (0.85) (0.87) (1.00) (0.78)
R-Squared 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.40 0.32 0.43 0.32 0.45 0.34 0.39
F statistics 30.41 10.86 17.51 11.78 15.75 10.14 11.76 10.24 24.94 17.00
Number of observations 84 84 40 40 35 35 27 27 51 51
Panel B: First Stage for Rule of Law
Full sample Ex-colonies Base sample
Base sample 
without Africa
Full sample without 
Europe
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares: Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2010
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3.4. Robustness 
3.4.1 Robustness Checks for Omitted Variables 
 
 Table 3.4 shows the robustness of the results in table 3.3. In keeping with AJR 
(2001), we add dummies for British and French colonies. In columns (1) (2), (5) 
and (6), British and French colonial dummies are included46 but these dummies 
have little effect on our main results. AJR (2001) finds that, in their first stage for 
average protection against expropriation risk, French colonial dummy is not 
significant but British colonial dummy is significant and positive. We also find that 
French colonial dummy is insignificant and British colonial dummy is positive and 
significant in our first stage for the rule of law index. This suggests that British 
colonies tend to have better institutions. 
As discussed in La porta et al. (1999), legal origin plays an important role in 
institutions and hence economic performance. We add French legal origin dummy 
in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8). We find that the impact of institutions on economic 
performance increases a little. In AJR (2001), the effect of institutions on GDP per 
capita is unchanged after controlling for French legal origin. However, the finding 
that French legal origin is closely related to worse institutions (AJR, 2001) is also 
found in the first stage for the rule of law index. 
The inclusion of dummies for French legal origin tends to increase the estimated 
coefficient on institutions. However, the impact of institutions on log GDP per 
capita is still highly significant. Inclusion of latitude increases the coefficient of 
the rule of law index. Further, inclusion of colonial dummies and legal origin 
dummies tends to increase the estimated coefficient on institutional quality, but 
its significance level is not influenced by them. 
  In all cases, the results are similar to those in table 4 and the coefficient of the 
                                                   
46 The omitted group is the others 
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rule of law is always significantly different from zero. In summary, the results from 
2SLS models, in which the rule of law index is instrumented using value 
fractionalization instead of historical variables, show a robust effect of current 
institutions on current economic performance47. 
 
Table 3. 4 Two stage least squares for extended controls 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; GDP per 
capita Source: Penn World Table; Latitude is absolute value of the latitude of the 
country (distance from the equator). It ranges from 0 and 1 and 0 is the equator. 
Source: CIA Fact Book and La Porta et al. (1999); Rule of Law ranges between -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance; Value fractionalization ranges 
from 0 and 0.67 and is minimized when every individual in a society shares similar 
                                                   
47 A robust effect of institutions on economic development is also reported for countries that are 
less affected by Europe (the full sample without Europe) and for the full sample. See Appendix-
table 3.2. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rule of Law 1.46*** 1.58*** 1.56*** 1.79*** 1.46*** 1.47*** 1.54*** 1.65***
(0.33) (0.44) (0.36) (0.51) (0.32) (0.41) (0.35) (0.46)
Latitude -1.12 -2.27 -0.10 -1.14
(1.71) (1.94) (1.59) (1.74)
British colonial dummy -0.90* -0.90* -0.89** -0.89**
(0.47) (0.49) (0.42) (0.42)
French colonial dummy -0.69 -0.60 -0.66 -0.65
(0.47) (0.51) (0.47) (0.49)
French legal origin 0.84* 0.96* 0.83** 0.87**
(0.44) (0.51) (0.40) (0.43)
value fractionalization 2.76*** 2.29*** 2.62*** 2.09*** 2.78*** 2.36*** 2.68*** 2.22***
(0.61) (0.63) (0.64) (0.63) (0.62) (0.65) (0.64) (0.64)
Latitude 1.62* 1.99** 1.52* 1.81**
(0.82) (0.80) (0.86) (0.82)
British colonial dummy 0.88*** 0.74*** 0.70*** 0.58**
(0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25)
French colonial dummy -0.69 0.06 0.22 0.06
(0.47) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33)
French legal origin -0.64** -0.61** -0.50** -0.47**
(0.25) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23)
R-Squared 0.51 0.57 0.44 0.54 0.44 0.48 0.39 0.46
F statistics 20.41 13.17 16.67 10.98 19.83 13.12 17.47 11.92
Number of observations 35 35 35 35 40 40 40 40
Base sample Ex-colonies
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares: Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2010
Panel B: First Stage for Rule of Law
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human values. See Appendix 3.1 for more details. Panel A reports the two stage-
least squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 2010 as the dependent variable 
and Rule of law is instrumented using value fractionalization. Panel B reports the 
corresponding first stage. 
 
3.4.2 The Exclusion Restriction 
 
   We can test the validity of our approach using AJR (2001) model. In columns 
(1) and (2) of table 3.5, we follow AJR (2001) and use the log of settler mortality 
(capped at a maximum level of 250, as in Acemoglu et al. 2014) as an instrument 
for institutions. Then, we include value fractionalization as an exogenous 
variable. In column (1), the coefficient of value fractionalization is 1.00 (with 
standard error 1.37) and value fractionalization has a coefficient of 0.89 (with 
standard error 1.50) in column (2). Therefore, in AJR (2001) model, we find that 
the coefficient on value fractionalization is statistically insignificant. This shows 
that value fractionalization has no direct impact on economic performance. Hall 
and Jones (1999) and Rodrik et al. (2004) use fraction of the population speaking 
English and fraction of the population speaking other European languages as 
instruments for institutions in IV estimation. In columns (3)-(6), we use the 
proportion of population speaking English as an instrument for the rule of law 
index. The estimation is done for base sample in columns (3) and (4), and for ex-
colonies in columns (5) and (6). Again, in all cases, value fractionalization is 
included as an exogenous variable. As seen in columns (3)-(6), we find that the 
coefficient of value fractionalization is statistically insignificant. Overall, table 
6 shows that the effect of value fractionalization on economic performance 
seems to work through the impact of institutional quality. This supports that 
value fractionalization is a valid instrument. 
  Given that there is no evidence that value fractionalization impacts economic 
performance directly, we follow other studies that used various cultural diversity 
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measures as instrument for the quality of institutions in IV estimation (see 
footnote 27 for details) 
 
 
Table 3. 5 Second Stage with Value fractionalization as Exogenous Variable 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; GDP per 
capita Source: Penn World Table; Latitude is absolute value of the latitude of the 
country (distance from the equator). It ranges from 0 and 1 and 0 is the equator. 
Source: CIA Fact Book and La Porta et al. (1999); Rule of Law ranges between -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance; Value fractionalization ranges 
from 0 and 0.67 and is minimized when every individual in a society shares similar 
human values. See Appendix 3.1 for more details. This table reports results from 
the regression in which value fractionalization is included as an exogenous variable 
and Rule of law is instrumented using alternative instruments. In columns (1) and 
(2), Rule of law is instrumented using log capped settler mortality. Source: 
Acemoglu et al. (2014). Columns (3)-(6) use the proportion of population speaking 
English as instrument for Rule of law. Source: Hall and Jones (1999). 
 
 
 
 
3.4.3 A Panel Dataset 
 
In this section, we run pooled OLS on various specifications using data from four 
waves of the World Values Survey. We take each country/wave average as an 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrument
Rule of Law 1.14*** 1.32** 1.09*** 1.23** 1.12*** 1.17**
(0.40) (0.54) (0.38) (0.49) (0.39) (0.48)
value fractionalization 1.00 0.89 1.13 1.08 1.00 0.97
(1.37) (1.50) (1.32) (1.41) (1.38) (1.43)
Latitude -1.40 -1.23 -0.40
(1.62) (1.53) (1.47)
Number of observations 35 35 35 35 40 40
Ex-colonies
Two-Stage Least Squares: Dependent Variable is log GDP per capita in 2010
Base sample
Second Stage with Value Fractionalization as Exogenous Variable
log capped potential settler mortality Population Speaking English
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observation48. Therefore, we calculate value fractionalization for each wave. Our 
panel data is unbalanced because some countries have data for only one wave 
while others have several waves. Further, instead of using country fixed effects 
we use latitude as an independent variable. In Columns (1) and (2) of table 3.6, 
we report results from pooled OLS for the full sample. Columns (3) and (4) report 
pooled OLS for ex-colonies. The results are very similar to table 3.3. In the last 
four columns, institutions are instrumented using value fractionalization. We find 
that the coefficients for the rule of law in the IV estimations are larger than that 
in the corresponding OLS estimations and value fractionalization can be used as 
an instrument for institutions not only for ex-colonies but also for the full sample. 
The results presented here fully support our main findings. 
 
 
Table 3. 6 Results using a panel dataset 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; GDP per 
capita Source: Penn World Table; Latitude is absolute value of the latitude of the 
country (distance from the equator). It ranges from 0 and 1 and 0 is the equator. 
Source: CIA Fact Book and La Porta et al. (1999); Rule of Law ranges between -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance; Value fractionalization ranges 
from 0 and 0.67 and is minimized when every individual in a society shares similar 
human values. See Appendix 3.1 for more details. In columns (5) -(8), Rule of law 
is instrumented using value fractionalization. Wave 3 was conducted over years 
1994-1998, wave 4 over years 1999-2004, wave 5 over years 2005-2009, and wave 
6 over years 2010-2014. 
                                                   
48 This way is drawn from Dearmon and Grier (2009). WVS is used and each country/wave 
average is taken as an observation. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rule of Law 0.91*** 0.78*** 0.93*** 0.84*** 1.29*** 1.14* 1.28*** 1.39***
(0.04) (0.047) (0.09) (0.10) (0.28) (0.62) (0.18) (0.28)
Latitude 1.40*** 1.14* 0.49 -0.98
(0.24) (0.60) (1.43) (1.33)
Number of observations 336 336 160 160 164 164 78 78
Full sample Ex-colonies Full sample Ex-colonies
Dependent Variable is log GDP per capita
Pooled OLS IV
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3.4.4 Value Fractionalization: Different Number of Groups 
 
  This study classifies individuals into three groups. However, one can reason that 
classifying individuals into a different number of groups is possible. In this section, 
we consider whether our main results are robust to defining value fractionalization 
in alternative ways. Using 10 items from Inglehart and Welzel (2005), this section 
uses k-means cluster analysis to classify individuals into 3-10 groups. Hence, we 
obtain 8 different value fractionalization indices. As a result, our main findings 
are proved to be robust to these changes of value fractionalization definition. For 
instance, let us consider value fractionalization based on 8 value types. Table 3.7 
shows IV regressions of log GDP per capita using value fractionalization based on 
8 value types as an instrument for the rule of law index. As shown in the table, 
we obtain similar results compared with table 3.3. Further, table 3.8 shows IV 
regressions using 5 different value fractionalization indices. In Columns (1) and 
(2), value fractionalization based on 4 groups is used as an instrument for 
institutions. Further, columns (3) and (4) use value fractionalization based on 5 
value types. As seen in the table, all the 5 value fractionalization indices seem to 
be valid instruments for institutions. In conclusion, the use of value 
fractionalization based on different definitions (different number of groups) has 
only little impact on our main results.  
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Table 3. 7 IV regressions of log GDP per capita (value fractionalization based on 8 
value types) 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Dependent 
variable is log GDP per capita Source: Penn World Table; Latitude is absolute value 
of the latitude of the country (distance from the equator). It ranges from 0 and 1 
and 0 is the equator. Source: CIA Fact Book and La Porta et al. (1999); Rule of law 
ranges between -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance value 
fractionalization is minimized when every individual in a society shares similar 
human values. Panel A reports the two stage-least squares estimates with log GDP 
per capita in 2010 as the dependent variable and Rule of Law is instrumented using 
value fractionalization based on 8 value types. Panel B reports the corresponding 
first stage. See Appendix 3.1 for more details. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Rule of Law 1.46*** 1.60*** 1.52*** 1.63*** 1.59*** 1.84*** 1.15*** 1.28*** 1.53*** 1.58***
(0.20) (0.36) (0.35) (0.46) (0.38) (0.55) (0.28) (0.32) (0.29) (0.36)
Latitude -0.69 -1.32 -2.62 -2.74** -0.67
(1.06) (1.84) (2.18) (1.37) (1.48)
value frac. (8  groups) 2.68*** 2.00*** 2.44*** 2.03*** 2.37*** 1.88*** 2.65*** 2.34*** 2.55*** 2.18***
(0.46) (0.55) (0.59) (0.58) (0.62) (0.61) (0.80) (0.73) (0.51) (0.52)
Latitude 1.23** 1.98** 2.14** 2.48** 1.73**
(0.57) (0.84) (0.87) (0.99) (0.77)
R-Squared 0.29 0.33 0.31 0.40 0.31 0.42 0.307 0.45 0.33 0.40
F statistics 34.17 13.38 17.25 12.12 14.61 9.47 11.07 10.21 24.58 17.56
Number of observations 84 84 40 40 35 35 27 27 51 51
Panel B: First Stage for Rule of Law
Full sample Ex-colonies Base sample
Base sample 
without Africa
Full sample without 
Europe
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares: Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2010
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Table 3. 8 IV regressions of log GDP per capita using different definition of value 
fractionalization 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Dependent 
variable is log GDP per capita Source: Penn World Table; Latitude is absolute value 
of the latitude of the country (distance from the equator). It ranges from 0 and 1 
and 0 is the equator. Source: CIA Fact Book and La Porta et al. (1999); Rule of law 
ranges between -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance value 
fractionalization ranges from 0 and 0.67 and is minimized when every individual 
in a society shares similar human values. Panel A reports the two stage-least 
squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 2010 as the dependent variable and 
Rule of Law is instrumented using value fractionalization. Panel B reports the 
corresponding first stage. Columns (1) and (2) use 4 value types. In columns (3) 
and (4), 5 value types are used. 6 value types are used in columns (5) and (6), 
whereas 7 value types are exploited in columns (7) and (8). Value fractionalization 
based on 9 groups is used in columns (9) and (10). Finally, value fractionalization 
based on 10 value types is used as an instrument in (11) and (12). See Appendix 
3.1 for more details.  
 
 
3.4.5 Additional Results 
 
  In order ensure that a few countries are not driving the main results, we re-
estimate the models with some countries excluded from our sample. We first see 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
number of groups
RuleofLaw 1.47*** 1.68*** 1.54*** 1.77*** 1.46*** 1.60*** 1.49*** 1.66*** 1.48*** 1.64*** 1.47*** 1.64***
(0.24) (0.52) (0.24) (0.47) (0.21) (0.36) (0.21) (0.39) (0.21) (0.40) (0.23) (0.44)
Latitude -0.87 -1.08 -0.67 -0.83 -0.78 -0.78
(1.41) (1.32) (1.06) (1.14) (1.14) (1.24)
corresponding value fractionalization 2.77*** 1.74** 2.66*** 1.80*** 2.82*** 2.08*** 2.69*** 1.94*** 2.55*** 1.83*** 2.48*** 1.67***
(0.57) (0.69) (0.53) (0.60) (0.49) (0.57) (0.48) (0.56) (0.46) (0.55) (0.49) (0.57)
Latitude 1.53** 1.55*** 1.32** 1.35** 1.31** 1.51***
(0.60) (0.56) (0.56) (0.56) (0.57) (0.57)
R-Squared 0.22 0.28 0.23 0.30 0.28 0.33 0.27 0.32 0.27 0.32 0.24 0.07
F-statistics 23.35 6.45 24.90 8.99 32.57 13.11 31.05 12.03 30.91 11.29 25.38 8.71
number of observations 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
Panel B: First stage for Rule of Law
Panel A: Two stage least squares :Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2010 
4 5 6 7 9 10
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that our main results are not driven by highly fragmented (homogeneous) 
countries with respect to human values. We do not report here but our results 
are robust to excluding the most homogeneous country Jordan (value 
fractionalization 0.06). Exclusion of three homogeneous countries, Jordan, 
Pakistan (value fractionalization 0.07) and Bangladesh (value fractionalization 
0.09), does not change our main results. Further, Croatia (value fractionalization 
0.66) is the most diverse country with respect to human values in our Full 
sample. Therefore, we exclude Croatia and estimate the impact of Rule of law 
on economic performance. Again, we find a significant effect of Rule of law on 
economic performance. In addition, exclusion of three diverse countries 
(Croatia, Uruguay and Slovakia) does not affect our results.  
  In addition, it is widely argued that rich countries may prefer efficient 
institutions. To alleviate concerns of reverse causation, we also use the Average 
rule of law for each country instead of the rule of law in 2010. As seen in 
Appendix-table 3.3. The coefficient estimates for average rule of law are very 
similar to the coefficients estimates for the rule of law index in 2010 in Table 3.3 
and are statistically different from zero. This table indicates that institutions 
cause economic development and value fractionalization can be used as an 
instrument for institutions. The use of average institutional quality instead of 
current institutional quality has only little impact on our estimation. 
  Further, we replace rule of law index with the average of six categories for the 
quality of institutions-Rule of Law, Control of Corruption, Government 
Effectiveness, Political stability and Absence of Voice / Terrorism, Regulatory 
Quality, Voice and accountability49. In conclusion, our main results survived. 
Therefore, the use of the average six categories does not affect our main 
findings and value fractionalization can be used as an instrument for the quality 
of institutions. 
                                                   
49 See Appendix 3.1 for details 
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Finally, in order to correct for heteroscedasticity, robust standard errors are 
used in all regressions in table 3.9. It reports the results using cluster robust 
standard error and finds that our main findings do not change a lot. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. 9 IV Regressions of log GDP per capita 
 
Notes: robust Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; 
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita Source: Penn World Table; Latitude is 
absolute value of the latitude of the country (distance from the equator). It ranges 
from 0 and 1 and 0 is the equator. Source: CIA Fact Book and La Porta et al. (1999); 
Rule of law ranges between -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance 
value fractionalization ranges from 0 and 0.67 and is minimized when every 
individual in a society shares similar human values. Panel A reports the two stage-
least squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 2010 as the dependent variable 
and Rule of Law is instrumented using value fractionalization. Panel B reports the 
corresponding first stage. See Appendix 3.1 for more details. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Rule of Law 1.47*** 1.64*** 1.48*** 1.59*** 1.50*** 1.72*** 1.11*** 1.25*** 1.49*** 1.54***
(0.20) (0.33) (0.27) (0.33) (0.28) (0.36) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.27)
Latitude -0.78 -1.20 -2.25* -2.66*** -0.56
(1.01) (1.28) (1.37) (1.03) (1.25)
value fractionalization 2.83*** 2.02*** 2.79*** 2.30*** 2.75*** 2.20*** 2.96*** 2.58*** 2.85*** 2.43***
(0.46) (0.58) (0.69) (0.68) (0.68) (0.68) (0.76) (0.70) (0.57) (0.59)
Latitude 1.32** 1.91** 2.08** 2.39** 1.63*
(0.66) (0.90) (0.92) (1.04) (0.87)
R-Squared 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.40 0.32 0.43 0.32 0.45 0.34 0.39
F statistics 38.51 12.09 16.30 11.33 16.48 10.28 15.17 13.78 25.06 16.71
Number of observations 84 84 40 40 35 35 27 27 51 51
Panel B: First Stage for Rule of Law
Full sample Ex-colonies Base sample
Base sample 
without Africa
Full sample without 
Europe
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares: Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2010
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3.5 Concluding Remarks for Chapter 3 
 
  In this study, we revisit the relationship between institutions and economic 
performance. The aim of this chapter is to check the robustness of results obtained 
by AJR (2001, 2012) supported by other recent papers such as Acemoglu et al. 
(2014). We follow their approach in general but challenge the use of historical 
data as an instrumental variable and propose instead a novel measure of value 
fractionalization reflecting the diversity in values. Our main results still resonate 
with the existing studies establishing that institutional quality affects economic 
performance. The IV estimates of institutional quality’s impact on GDP per capita 
are larger than the OLS estimates and significantly different from zero. We further 
report that our results are not driven by African countries and are robust to 
controlling for latitude.  
Importantly, there are two advantages of using value fractionalization as an 
instrument for institutions. Firstly, the use of value fractionalization makes it 
possible to mitigate some concerns in previous literature: poor quality of historical 
dataset and the link that historical variables may affect current economic 
performance not only through institutional development but also through past 
economic performance. The second advantage is the sample that includes ex-
colonies and also countries less affected by the Europeans. Unlike previous studies 
that use premises based on colonial policy, our premises are independent of 
colonial policy. Therefore, the use of value fractionalization as an instrument for 
institutions enables us to investigate the impact of institutions not only for ex-
colonies but also for countries that are less affected by European countries. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 3.1 Data 
 
DATA DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES 
 
GDP per capita (only section 3.1): Source: The Maddison-Project available at 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm 
GDP per capita (section 2 to section 4): Source: Penn World Table 
Latitude: Absolute value of the latitude of the country (distance from the equator). 
It ranges from 0 and 1 and 0 is the equator. Source: CIA Fact Book and La Porta et 
al. (1999) 
Constraint on executive in1900: It ranges from 1 to 7 and the higher score 
indicates more constraints. Score 1 indicates unlimited authority; 3 indicates 
slight to moderate limitations; 5 indicates substantial limitations and 7 indicates 
executive parity or subordination. Source: AJR (2001) 
Democracy in 1900: It ranges from 0 to 10 and the higher score indicated more 
democracy. Points from three dimensions; Competitiveness of Political 
Participation (from 1 to 3); Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (from 1 to 
2 and plus 1 point if there is an election); and Constraints on Chief Executive (from 
1 to 4). Source: AJR (2001) 
Rule of Law: “Perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence” (Kaufmann et al. 2013). This measure ranges from approximately -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. Source: Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
European settler mortality rate: Estimated European settlers’ mortality rate. 
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Source: AJR (2001) 
Log capped settler mortality: Settler mortality capped at 250 per 1,000 per 
annum (i.e., any mortality observation above 250 is set to equal 250. This is used 
to limit the high mortality outliers. Source: Acemoglu et al. (2012) 
Population speaking English: Fraction of population speaking English. Source: Hall 
and Jones (1999) 
Legal origin dummies: Legal origin of the company law or commercial code of 
each country. We use French legal dummy. Source: La Porta et al. (1999) 
Colonial dummies: Dummy indicating whether country was a British, French, 
German, Spanish, Italian, Belgian, Dutch, or Portuguese colony. We use British and 
French colonial dummy. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
Control of Corruption: “perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as 
well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.” This measure ranges 
from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. Source: 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
Government Effectiveness: “perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.” This measure ranges 
from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. Source: 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
Political stability and Absence of Voice/terrorism: “Perceptions of the likelihood 
of political instability and/or politicallymotivated violence, including terrorism.” 
This measure ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance 
performance. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
Regulatory Quality: “perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
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sector development.” This measure ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 
(strong) governance performance. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) 
Voice and accountability: “perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media.” This measure ranges from 
approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. Source: 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
 
 
Ten Items for Inglehart’s Dimensions  
 
See chapter 2 for details 
Source: World Values Surveys Wave 3 (1995-1998), Wave4 (1999-2004), Wave 5 
(2005-2009) and Wave 6 (2010-2014).  
Importance of God : 
Teach Children Obedience and Faith rather than Independence and Determination 
(Autonomy index) : 
Disapproval of Abortion : 
National Pride : 
Respect for Authority : 
Priority for Economic and Physical Security (Materialist Values) : 
Feeling of Unhappiness: 
Disapproval of Homosexuality : 
Abstaining from Signing Petitions: 
Distrusting in Other People: 
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Appendix 3.2 List of Additional Figures and Tables 
 
 
Appendix-Figure 3. 1 The relationship between early economic performance and 
current economic performance (Ex-colonies) 
 
 
Appendix-Table 3. 1 Value Fractionalization Index (3 value types) 
 
Notes: The number shows value fractionalization index in each country. 
Heterogeneous and homogeneous countries with respect to human values are 
shown in the table.  
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Log GDP per capita, 1900
Croatia 0.66 Jordan 0.06
Uruguay 0.66 Pakistan 0.07
Slovakia 0.66 Bangladesh 0.09
Spain 0.65 Indonesia 0.11
Finland 0.65 Tanzania 0.11
Albania 0.65 Egypt 0.11
Canada 0.65 Morocco 0.11
High Fractionalization index Low Fractionalization index
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Appendix-Table 3. 2 Two-stage least squares: robustness checks for the full sample 
and for countries less affected by Europe (the full sample without Europe) 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; GDP per 
capita. Source: Penn World Table; Latitude is absolute value of the latitude of the 
country (distance from the equator). It ranges from 0 and 1 and 0 is the equator. 
Source: CIA Fact Book and La Porta et al. (1999); Rule of Law ranges between -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance; Value fractionalization ranges 
from 0 and 0.67 and is minimized when every individual in a society shares similar 
human values. Panel A reports the two stage-least squares estimates with log GDP 
per capita in 2010 as the dependent variable and Rule of Law is instrumented using 
value fractionalization. Panel B reports the corresponding first stage. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rule of Law 1.29*** 1.43*** 1.65*** 1.79*** 1.38*** 1.36*** 1.68*** 1.76***
(0.18) (0.33) (0.27) (0.45) (0.25) (0.32) (0.33) (0.42)
Latitude -0.79 -0.68 0.18 -0.79
(1.07) (1.23) (1.32) (1.54)
British colonial dummy -0.50** -0.62** -0.66** -0.66**
(0.23) (0.30) (0.33) (0.33)
French colonial dummy -0.49 -0.53 -0.597 -0.61
(0.37) (0.40) (0.43) (0.44)
French legal origin 0.50* 0.47 0.87** 0.90**
(0.29) (0.30) (0.39) (0.42)
value fractionalization 3.22*** 2.27*** 2.65*** 1.97*** 2.99*** 2.57*** 2.55*** 2.16***
(0.56) (0.63) (0.55) (0.63) (0.56) (0.59) (0.57) (0.58)
Latitude 1.65*** 1.27** 1.48*** 1.56**
(0.58) (0.60) (0.78) (0.75)
British colonial dummy 0.45** 0.56** 0.58** 0.48**
(0.18) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
French colonial dummy 0.02 0.11 0.15 0.03
(0.35) (0.34) (0.32) (0.32)
French legal origin -0.17 -0.08 -0.47** -0.46**
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
R-Squared 0.32 0.39 0.28 0.32 0.43 0.48 0.40 0.45
F statistics 32.95 13.11 23.00 9.82 28.02 18.93 20.35 13.83
Number of observations 79 79 84 84 48 48 51 51
Full sample without EuropeFull sample
Panel B: First Stage for Rule of Law
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares: Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2010
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Appendix-Table 3. 3 Two-stage least squares using Average Rule of law between 
2002 and 2010 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Dependent 
variable is log GDP per capita in 2010. Source: Penn World Table; Latitude is 
absolute value of the latitude of the country (distance from the equator). It ranges 
from 0 and 1 and 0 is the equator. Source: CIA Fact Book and La Porta et al. (1999); 
Rule of Law ranges between -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance; 
Average Rule of Law is mean of Rule of Law from 2002 to 2010. Value 
fractionalization ranges from 0 and 0.67 and is minimized when every individual 
in a society shares similar human values. Panel A reports the two stage-least 
squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 2010 as the dependent variable and 
Rule of law is instrumented using value fractionalization. Panel B reports the 
corresponding first stage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Average Rule of Law 1.52*** 1.67*** 1.47*** 1.58*** 1.51*** 1.72*** 1.13*** 1.27*** 1.50*** 1.55***
(0.22) (0.41) (0.32) (0.43) (0.35) (0.49) (0.26) (0.30) (0.27) (0.35)
Latitude -0.66 -1.20 -2.14 -2.60** -0.60
(1.13) (1.71) (1.92) (1.26) (1.41)
value fractionalization 2.74*** 1.99*** 2.81*** 2.32*** 2.74*** 2.20*** 2.90*** 2.54*** 2.84*** 2.41***
(0.51) (0.61) (0.64) (0.64) (0.67) (0.69) (0.83) (0.78) (0.55) (0.57)
Latitude 1.22** 1.92** 2.02** 2.31** 1.64**
(0.58) (0.81) (0.84) (0.96) (0.76)
R-Squared 0.26 0.30 0.34 0.43 0.34 0.44 0.33 0.46 0.35 0.41
F statistics 28.83 10.54 19.41 13.25 16.75 10.94 12.19 10.67 26.34 18.01
Number of observations 84 84 40 40 35 35 27 27 51 51
Full sample Ex-colonies Base sample
Base sample 
without Africa
Full sample without 
Europe
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares: Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2010
Panel B: First Stage for Rule of Law
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Appendix3.3 List of Countries Included in the Analysis 
 
Notes: Base sample: 35 countries Ex-colonies: Base sample and 5 countries 
shown in the table. Full sample: all the 84 countries included in this table. 
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Chapter Four: Culture and 
Economic Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
  This chapter investigates the role of culture (tolerance and respect for 
other) in economic outcomes using a panel dataset. We find that 
proportion of “value type”, fraction of individuals who share similar 
values, plays an important role in estimating the impact of culture on 
economic performance. One of the contributions of this chapter is that the 
use of value type as an instrument for culture instead of religion. As a 
result, this chapter succeeds to see the impact of respect on economic 
outcomes alleviating the concerns of the existence of non-religious 
countries. Our results are consistent with the research that shows the 
importance of respect in economic outcomes. Further, regardless of 
several treatments we employ we find the pattern obtained in the main 
results remains. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
There is a growing body of literature that shows that culture affects 
economic development (Breuer and McDermott, 2013; Gorodnichenko and 
Roland, 2011; Guiso et al., 2006; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Tabellini, 2010). 
Researchers has been attempted to see the causal relationship between 
many aspects of culture and economic outcomes. Culture is often measured 
by indicators of human values such as trust50. Tabellini (2010) argues that 
culture and institutions have impact on economic performance. In this 
chapter, we investigate the role of culture in economic development. The 
difficulty of investigating the role of culture in economic outcomes is 
economic outcomes also influences culture. Take trust as an example. 
Countries with high trust may be wealthier because trust affects economic 
outcomes. On the other hand, a more affluent country may promote more 
trust in the culture51. This chapter addresses this endogeneity problem using 
IV estimations. A large and growing body of literature has investigated the 
causal relationship between culture and economic performance using IV 
estimation. For instance, an article by Tabellini (2010) uses the literacy rate 
at the end of the 19th century and the past political institutions as 
instruments for culture in IV estimation. Further, many papers use some 
indicators of religion52 as an instrument for culture. Guiso et al. (2006) use 
the individual's religion and country of ancestor's origin as instruments for 
trust. In Zak and Knack (2001), population shares of the Catholic, Muslim, 
                                                   
50 Section 4.2.2 shows the relationship between culture and economic 
outcomes in various perspectives of culture 
51 Many researchers refer that economic development has a certain impact 
on culture in a country. 
52 Population share of Muslim is used in many papers to instrument culture. 
One of the difficulties in using religion is shown in the example of the 
Middle East. The main sects of the Islamic religion in this region are Sunni 
and Shi’a. However, the majority of the people in this region are classified 
as Muslims.  
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and Christian Orthodox are used as instruments for trust in their cross-
country growth regression. Further, Knack (2002) uses religious composition 
as instruments for social capital. In summary, many papers use religion and 
historical variables as instruments for culture in their IV estimations.  
  Our identification strategy is similar to that of papers using religion as 
instrument for culture. However, instead of using religious affiliation, we 
use “value type” as one of the instruments for culture. Using world-wide 
survey data, this chapter classifies people into three groups (value types) 
and people who made similar responses are grouped together. Papers that 
use religion as instrument for culture assume that religion does not affect 
economic performance directly. In other words, proportion of people who 
share similar beliefs and thoughts has no direct impact on economic 
performance. We therefore assume that proportion of people who share 
similar values and beliefs (value type) has no direct impact on economic 
performance. Further, the probability of meeting with similar value type 
depends on the proportion of each value type. As culture (human values) 
seems to be affected by people who meet, it is natural to assume that 
proportion of value type affects culture53. Due to the above reasons, we 
assume that value type affects economic performance only through culture. 
  Value type is created using the following method. We first select 10 
questions from WVS that are important dimensions of human values 
(Schwartz, 1999)54. Then, individuals who made similar responses in the 10 
questions are classified into the same value type. Therefore, we recognize 
that people in the same value type shares similar values.  
  This chapter considers the impact of “Respect for others (respect)” that 
has been shown to promote economic development by many researchers. 
                                                   
53 As seen in Appendix-Table 4.1, 89.74 percent of people in Jordan are classified as 
value type 1. Hence, it might be difficult for people in Jordan to be affected by value 
type 2 or value type 3. This leads to our assumption that the proportion of each value 
type affects culture. 
54 Ten questions used in this analysis are presented in section 2.4.2.2 Cultural framework 
by Schwartz 
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Tabellini (2010) argues that trust and respect for others foster economic 
development. Respect for others is considered to be important because it 
discourages cheating and it promotes the degree of trust in a society (Breuer 
and Mcdermott, 2013). Further, a positive impact of respect on economic 
outcomes is observed by them. In their IV estimations, respect is 
instrumented using “the proportions of the populations in 1980 that are 
identified as Catholic or Protestant” and “Civil liberties index in 1972”. 
In substitution for religion this chapter uses value type. That is, we use “the 
proportions of the populations that are identified as one value type” and 
“Civil liberties index” as instruments for respect in our IV estimations. The 
results obtained in this chapter support that proportion of value type affects 
economic outcomes only through respect. 
  This chapter measures respect for others using the World Values Survey 
(WVS). Proportion of individuals selecting “Respect” in the following 
question is our measure of respect in a country. 
Respect for others (Question wording) :  
“Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at 
home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please 
choose up to five. (CODE FIVE ONLY)”  
 “Tolerance and respect for other people (a035)” 
  
 Our approach is similar to the way adopted by Breuer and Mcdermott (2013) 
but, we use value affiliations (types) instead of religious affiliations as an 
instrument for culture. This improves the robustness of the results in the 
literature.  
  Culture is often instrumented using historical variables (e.g. Tabellini, 
2010) and religion (e.g. Guiso et al., 2006; Breuer and Mcdermott, 2013; Zak 
and Knack, 2001). As seen in Figure 3.5 (chapter 3), early economic 
performance tended to persist. Further, much of the literature shows that 
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culture affects economic development.  
It is shown by researchers that culture cause economic development.  
Therefore, it is natural to assume that this causal relationship is also true in 
the past. Hence, historical variables may have an impact on past economic 
performance because historical variables have an impact on past economic 
performance through past culture55 . Further, past economic performance 
tends to persist to the present. This implies that it is required to be careful 
when we use historical variables as instruments for current culture because 
it may lead to misleading conclusions. 
  There are several advantages to our approach compared with previous 
studies. First of all, this chapter is not using historical variables as 
instruments for culture so that we do not need to concern about the link 
mentioned above. Further, this chapter finds advantages of using our 
instrument instead of religion. Although many researchers use religion as 
instruments for culture, there are many people who are not so much 
affected by religion. Almost 100 percent of people in Egypt, Jordan, and 
Libya think that religion is important or rather important in their lives56. 
However, in Japan, only 21 percent of people think that religion is important 
or rather important. Further, in Sweden, only 27 percent of people agree 
with the importance of religion. As religion is important for some countries 
and not so important for other countries, it is beneficial to find different 
instruments in order to estimate the impact of culture in non-religious 
countries. In doing so, we can check the robustness of the results obtained 
by papers that assume religion affect economic performance only through 
culture. Secondly, it seems somewhat difficult to use religion because many 
people belong to more than one religion. The CIA World Fact Book shows 
that 83.9 percent of Japanese are classified as Shintoism and 71.4 percent 
                                                   
55 Appendix-Figure 4.1 shows this relationship. It illustrates the link between early 
culture, early economic performance and current economic performance 
56 World Values Survey Wave 6 (2010-2014) 
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as Buddhism. According to Pew Research Reports, “As of 2010, there were 
1.1 billion religiously unaffiliated people around the world, accounting for 
about one-in-six (16%) people worldwide. This makes the unaffiliated the 
third-largest religious grouping worldwide, behind Christians and Muslims, 
and about equal in size to the world's Catholic population”. Therefore, one 
of the merits of this paper is attained by the use of value type. The use of 
value type enables us to see the impact of culture on economic outcomes 
not only for religious countries but also for non-religious countries. In order 
to see the impact of culture on economic performance in non-religious 
countries, this chapter requires to find criteria for selecting religious and 
non-religious countries. We look at answers to the following question from 
WVS. 
 
 “A006 (Question Wording): 
For each of the following aspects, indicate how important it is in your 
life. Would   you say it is: Religion 
1 Very important 2 Rather important 3 Not very important 4 Not at all 
important” 
 
 
  In our analysis, we identify whether a country is religious or not by 
proportion of individuals selecting “very important” or “rather important”. 
Countries where the proportion of people choosing “very important” or 
“rather important” is high (low) is classified as religious country (non-
religious country). 
  In this chapter we first perform OLS and regress economic outcomes 
(output per worker and GDP per capita) on culture (respect for others). A 
strong positive relationship between respect for others and economic 
outcomes is found. Further, we add 10 variables from WVS, one at a time, 
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to see the impact of respect. One of the reasons why we include 10 
variables57 is that these variables can be a candidate for an omitted variable 
that is correlated with respect. In conclusion, we find that the impact of 
respect on economic outcomes remain significant in all cases. Then, respect 
is instrumented using proportion of the population identified as one value 
type and civil liberty index. A positive impact of respect on economic 
outcomes is observed in our IV regressions. 
  In a series of robustness checks, we include variables such as French legal 
origin (La porta et al., 1999) and ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al., 
2003). The main results are robust to the inclusion of these variables. Trust 
is commonly used by Economists to represent social capital and it has been 
argued that trust is fundamental determinant of economic outcomes. 
Therefore, this chapter includes it in our regressions accompanied with 
respect, latitude, French legal origin and ethnic fractionalization. Although 
the estimates changes by this treatment, inclusion of these variables has 
only little impact on our main results. Further our results are robust to 
changing criteria for the classification of religious country. The sources of 
data on economic outcomes are standard. We take Economic data from the 
Penn World Tables (version 7.0) and cultural values from WVS.  
  This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the literature on 
culture and economic performance. Section 4.3 shows a discussion of our 
data. In section 4.4, we present our main results. Section 4.5 investigates 
the robustness of our results and section 4.6 provides concluding remarks. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
57 “Trust”, “Independence”, “Hardwork”, “Feeling of Responsibility”, “Imagination”, 
“Thrift saving money and things”, “Determination perseverance”, “Religious faith”, 
“Unselfishness”, and “Obedience” 
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4.2 Literature Review 
 
The literature linking culture to economic outcomes is growing. This 
section first considers definitions of culture. Then, we briefly show previous 
work done by non-economists and economists on culture and 
economic/political outcomes. Finally, we review the impact of several 
aspects of culture on economic outcomes. 
Culture “denotes a historically transmitted pattern of meanings 
embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in 
symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and 
develop their knowledge about and their attitudes toward life (Geertz, 
1973).” In Guiso et al. (2006), culture is defined as “those customary beliefs 
and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged 
from generation to generation.” Alesina and Giuliano (2015) point out that 
“Empirical papers, therefore, combine values and beliefs in the same 
definition.”  
The causal relationship between culture and economic/political 
outcomes has been investigated by non-economists. In a case study of life in 
a rural village in Southern Italy, Banfield (1958) addresses a cultural 
explanation for poverty. He attributes the poverty to the excessive pursuit 
of narrow self-interest by its inhabitants. Further, Putnam (1993) provides 
evidence that the performance of local government in Italy is determined 
by social capital. Local governments functioned much better in places that 
have tradition and experienced free city states in the Middle Age. That is, 
culture affects the quality of political institutions. 
As a measurement of culture, “Economists have measured culture in 
three different ways: by using survey data; by looking at second-generation 
immigrants to isolate the impact of culture, holding constant the economic 
and institutional environment; and by collecting experimental evidence 
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(Alesina and Giuliano, 2015).”  
In this chapter, we measure culture using survey data. Further, we 
introduce some specific aspects of culture-trust, respect, responsibility, 
individualism and others. 
It has been reported that trust positively affects economic development 
(Zak and Knack, 2001). As a measure of trust, many researchers use following 
question from World Values Survey.  
“Trust (Question wording):  
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or 
that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?:  
1 Most people can be trusted, 2 need to be very careful.”  
 
Trust is measured by the percentage of respondents say “most people can 
be trusted”. Therefore, it can be interpreted as generalized trust toward 
others. In Zak and Knack (2001), trust promotes investment and growth. 
Further, it is argued that trust enhances innovation because it reduces 
entrepreneurs’ monitoring cost (Knack and Keefer ,1997). Beugelsdijk et al. 
(2004) check robustness of the results in Zak and Knack (2001) and find that 
they are highly robust. It is concluded in the paper that social trust plays an 
important role in economic growth. 
As discussed in Introduction, respect is recognized as one of the important 
factors to enhance economic development. Accompanied with respect, the 
impact of responsibility has been investigated. Responsibility is measured 
using the following question from WVS. 
 
 Responsibility (Question wording):  
“Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at 
home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please 
choose up to five. (CODE FIVE ONLY)”  
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   “Feeling of responsibility (a032)”  
 
 
The proportion of individuals choosing a032 in the question is used to 
represent responsibility in a country. Breuer and Mcdermott (2013) show that 
respect and responsibility are critical to output. They also show that respect 
and responsibility reduce the impact of trust on output.  
 Using Hofstede’s (2001) data, Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011) show 
that the individualism-collectivism dimension is the most important cultural 
variable that affects long-run growth. Further, a causal effect of 
individualism on economic outcomes is investigated in Gorodnichenko and 
Roland (2010). In order to see the impact of individualism, Individualism 
score is instrumented using frequency of blood types. As a result, they 
observe that individualist culture leads to innovation and rapid growth. 
Tabellini (2010) and Williamson (2009) use combination of 4 variables- 
trust, respect, control, and obedience. This chapter sees the definition of 
obedience in section 4.4. Control is measure by the following question in the 
survey: 
 
A173 How much freedom of choice and control (Question wording): 
 “Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over 
their lives, while other people feel that what we do has no real effect on 
what happens to them. Please use this scale (from 1 to 10) where 1 means 
‘none at all’ and 10 means ‘a great deal’ to indicate how much freedom 
of choice and control in life you have over the way your life turns out.”  
 
Average value of the question is used to define control. The way to 
create culture is that they extracted their first principal component from 
the whole data set using above-mentioned four variables. Tabellini (2010) 
120 
 
120 
 
shows that culture is positively correlated with trust, respect and control. 
On the other hand, it is negatively correlated with obedience. In the 
analysis, culture encourages economic development. Further, Williamson 
(2009) pointed out the importance of informal institutions using this index 
(culture). 
 
 
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
4.3.1 Value Type 
  
In this section, we briefly discuss the measure of value type. World Values 
Survey (WVS) is used to construct value type and proportion of the 
population identified as one value type. The way of creating value type is 
similar to the way we have done in chapter 2 and chapter 3. In chapter 2, 
we adopt ten items that Inglehart and Baker (2000) and Inglehart and Welzel 
(2005) used. However, in this chapter, we use Schwartz 10 items. As 
mentioned in chapter 2, Schwartz (1994) proposed 10 basic human values. 
WVS adopts the following modified version. 
 
 
1. It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be 
creative (Self-direction) 
2. It is important to this person to be rich (Power) 
3. It is important to this person living in secure surroundings 
( Security) 
4. It is important to this person to have a good time 
( Hedonism) 
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5. It is important to this person to help the people nearby 
( Benevolence) 
6. It is important to this person being very successful 
(Achievement)  
7. It is important to this person adventure and taking risks 
(Stimulation) 
8. It is important to this person to always behave properly 
(Conformity) 
9. It is important to this person looking after the environment 
(Universalism) 
10. It is important to this person tradition (Tradition) 
 
Individuals rate the importance of each item on a 6-point scale labeled 1 
(Very much like me), 2 (Like me), 3 (Somewhat like me), 4 (A little like me), 
5 (Not like me), 6 (not at all like me). We use the fifth round and the sixth 
round of WVS data, which were collected in 2005–2014 because of 
availability of dataset: Wave 5 (2005-2009) and Wave 6 (2010-2014). We use 
all the countries available to construct value type but, we exclude some 
countries because some countries have no observations for our economic 
and cultural variables. The number of respondents varies across cultural 
groups and some cultural groups have 2 waves and others have only 1 wave. 
In contrast to ethnicity, language, and religion there are no pre-determined 
groupings for human values. By following Chapter 2, this chapter uses k-
means cluster analysis in order to classify respondents into three groups. K-
means cluster analysis makes it possible to group n observations (individuals) 
into k clusters in which each individual belongs to the cluster with the 
nearest response. By doing so, respondents in the same group (value type) 
share common characteristics and values. Cluster analysis tells us the 
population shares of the value types. Below is an explanation for each value 
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type. 
 
Value type, Main countries and Main features of each value type 
Value type 1: 
Main Countries: Jordan, Pakistan and South Africa 
Main Feature: People in this value type tend to disagree with 1 (self-
direction) and 2 (power) 
Value type 2: 
Main Countries: Georgia, Brazil and Morocco 
Main Feature: People in this value type tend to disagree with 7 
(stimulation) 
Value type 3: 
  Main Countries: Japan, Netherland and South Korea 
  Main Feature: People in this value type tend to disagree with 10 (Tradition) 
 
Approximately 90 percent of individuals in Jordan are classified as value 
type 1 in wave 5. Further, 71 percent of people in South Africa are grouped 
into value type 1. Value type 1 mainly consists with people who don’t agree 
with self-direction and power. More than half of people in Brazil and Georgia 
are classified as value type 2. One of the features of people in value type 2 
is that they disagree with the importance of adventure compared with other 
value types. The respondents in Japan, Netherland and South Korea tend to 
have this value type. People classified as value type 3 have a tendency to 
disagree the importance of tradition. Appendix-Table 4.2.1 and Appendix-
Table 4.2.2 show the distribution of the population of value types of the 
countries in wave 5 and 6. We use value type 1 because it is the largest group 
(popular value type) among three. 
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Figure 4. 1 Value type 1 and Respect (Full sample) 
Notes: Value type 1 reflects the proportion of value type 1 in a country. The 
Vertical Axis respect; The Horizontal Axis Value type 1 
 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the relationship between the proportion of people 
classified as value type 1 in a country and respect. A negative and a linear 
relationship is found in the figure (r = -0.35, p < 0.01)58. The next section 
examines this relationship. In Figure 4.2, we find the negative link between 
responsibility and the fraction of value type 1 (r = -0.60, p < 0.01). Finally, 
Figure 4.3 show the scatter plots of trust against proportion of value type 1. 
The scatter plots reveal a clear negative relationship (r = -0.51, p < 0.01).   
 
                                                   
58 This will be our first stage for our main two stage least squares estimates. 
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Figure 4. 2 Value type 1 and Responsibility (Full sample) 
Notes: value type 1 reflects the proportion of value type 1 in a country The 
Vertical Axis responsibility; The Horizontal Axis Value type 1 
 
 
Figure 4. 3 Value type 1 and Trust (Full sample) 
Notes: value type 1 reflects the proportion of value type 1 in a country. The 
Vertical Axis Trust; The Horizontal Axis Value type 1 
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4.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Main datasets used in our empirical analysis are the Penn world table and 
the World Values Survey. As it has been reported that respect for others is 
an important in determinant of economic outcomes, we use respect for 
others as a measure of culture. As mentioned before, our cultural values 
such as respect and trust are measured using World Values Survey. We used 
Wave 5 and Wave 6 because Schwartz questions are not included in Wave 1 
to Wave 4. Except data from WVS, this section follows Dearmon and Grier 
(2009) and takes each country/wave average as an observation. Our 
combined data yields observations for 65 countries that include developed 
and developing countries59. Table4.1 provides descriptive statistics for the 
key variables. 
 
Table 4. 1 Data Summary for key Variables 
 
 
 
  Before investigating the impact of respect in various countries, this 
section makes most of our identification strategy. Much of research use 
identification strategy that involves proportion of the individuals who are 
identified as Muslim, Catholic, or Protestant. However, this study uses 
fraction of the population classified as value type 1. Therefore, we can 
                                                   
59 The list of countries in our sample is shown in Appendix 4.3. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log output per worker 65 9.89 1.08 7.06 11.47
Log GDP per capita 65 9.07 1.16 6.32 10.83
Latitude 65 0.36 0.19 0.02 0.71
Respect 65 0.70 0.13 0.36 0.94
Trust 63 0.27 0.18 0.04 0.74
Value type 1 65 0.39 0.19 0.03 0.90
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comfortably see the impact of culture for countries where the proportion of 
a religious person in a country is low. To select non-religious countries from 
65 observations, we use the following question from WVS. 
 
“A006 (Question Wording): 
For each of the following aspects, indicate how important it is in your life. 
Would you say it is: Religion 
1 Very important 2 Rather important 3 Not very important 4 Not at all 
important” 
   
  This chapter focuses on the proportion of individuals selecting “1 Very 
important” or “2 Rather important” in this question. Hence, a006 ranges 
from 0 to 1 and the higher value indicates religious countries60. Appendix-
Table 4.3 contains data summary for our key variable where a006 is less than 
0.861. It is observed that non-religious countries tend to be wealthier than 
religious countries. Appendix-table 4.5 show the list of countries with (1) 
a006<0.80, (2) 0.80≤a006<0.85, (3) 0.85≤a006<0.90, (4) 0.90≤a006<0.95, 
and (5) 0.95≤a006. 
  Figure 4.4 shows the relationship between value type 1 and respect for 
non-religious countries (countries with a006<0.8). We observe negative 
relationship between value type 1 and respect. In our full dataset, Sweden 
has highest respect with 0.94. The second highest is Switzerland with 0.92. 
On the other hand, Ethiopia is 0.36 and this is the lowest in our dataset. 
Restricting our attention to countries with a006<0.80, the lowest respect is 
Lebanon with 0.47. In the next section, we see a base estimation of the 
relationship between respect and economic outcomes using an ordinary least 
squares specification. 
                                                   
60 In section 4.5.2, we use a040 (religious faith) from WVS instead of a006 to see the 
robustness of our results. 
61 Appendix-Table 4.2.1 
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Figure 4. 4 Value type 1 and Respect for non-religious countries (countries 
a006<0.8) 
Notes: value type 1 reflects the proportion of value type 1 in a country. 
A006<0.8 means that more than 20 percent of people in a country think that 
religion is not so important. There are 32 countries in the figure. The Vertical 
Axis respect; The Horizontal Axis value type 1 
 
 
4.4 Results 
 
4.4.1. Ordinary Least-Squares Regressions 
 
We begin by examining the role of respect that has been studied in current 
literature. Further, latitude is included as an independent variable so that 
we are not going to estimate our model using country fixed effects. Our 
baseline specification is as follows 
𝑌𝑗𝑘 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑗𝑘 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗𝑘 
Where 𝑌𝑗𝑘 measures economic outcomes (e.g. log GDP per capita and log 
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output per worker) for country j in wave k. 𝐶𝑗𝑘 is a measure of culture and 
we are interested in 𝛼1  because it captures the impact of culture on 
economic outcomes. 𝑋𝑗 represents a control variable (if included) and we 
basically use latitude as a control variable. 𝜀𝑗𝑘 is the error term. Now, we 
estimate this model using pooled OLS because our panel data is unbalanced62 
and inclusion of latitude makes it possible to grasp country-specific effects63.  
Table 4.2 shows the relationship between respect and economic outcomes 
for variety of samples. The results obtained using pooled OLS is shown in the 
table. The estimation is done for three different samples.  
 
(i) Full sample: There are 65 countries. 
(ii) a006<0.90: More than 10 percent of people in a country think that 
religion is not important. There are 39 countries. 
(iii) a006<0.80: More than 20 percent of people in a country think that 
religion is not so important. There are 32 countries. 
 
The regressions reveal the following results. Column (1) shows that in the 
full sample there is a strong relationship between respect and log output 
per worker. The R-square for the regression shows that over 40 percent of 
variation in output per worker is associated with variation in respect for 
others. Latitude is included as a regressor in even columns. In column (2), it 
is shown that the impact of respect remains significant. Inclusion of latitude 
changes the coefficient of respect a little (5.69 to 4.05). Columns (3)-(6) 
show that there is a strong correlation between respect and output per 
worker even after excluding countries where the proportion of a religious 
person in a country is relatively low. As seen in Columns (7)-(12), we find 
similar relationship using log GDP per capita as a dependent variable instead 
of log output per worker. There is a strong positive relationship between 
                                                   
62 Some countries have data for only one wave while others have two waves. 
63 As latitude does not vary over time, it captures country-specific effects. 
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respect and log GDP per capita for full sample and for countries with low 
a006 (non-religious countries). As a whole, the results in table 4.2 show a 
strong tie between respect and economic outcomes.  
 
Table 4. 2 OLS-Respect and Economic Outcomes 
 
 
Notes: robust Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; 
Latitude is absolute value of the latitude of the country (distance from the 
equator). It ranges from 0 and 1 and 0 is the equator. Source: CIA Fact Book 
and La Porta et al. (1999); Respect is from WVS. Columns (1)-(6) report OLS 
regression with log output per worker as the dependent variable; Source: 
Penn World Table. In columns (7)-(12), dependent variable is log GDP per 
capita; Source: Penn World Table. In columns (3), (4), (9) and (10), we used 
countries that less than 90 percent of people think that religion is important 
in their lives. In columns (5), (6), (11) and (12), we used countries that less 
than 80 percent of people insist the importance of religion. Source: a006, 
WVS. See Appendix 4.1 for more details. 
 
 
 
In order to find whether there are variables for culture that plays 
important role in economic performance, we include candidates for omitted 
variables. We follow Breuer and Mcdermott (2013) and add one variable at 
a time. We use 10 variables that are created from the following questions 
from WVS: 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Respect 5.69*** 4.05*** 4.69*** 3.61*** 4.86*** 3.35*** 5.94*** 4.19*** 4.91*** 3.80*** 5.07*** 3.59***
(0.80) (0.76) (1.06) (0.94) (1.13) (1.07) (0.81) (0.78) (0.99) (0.87) (1.02) (0.98)
Latitutde 2.77*** 2.08*** 2.49*** 2.96*** 2.13*** 2.45**
(0.54) (0.56) (0.89) (0.57) (0.57) (0.89)
R-squared 0.43 0.63 0.43 0.59 0.46 0.60 0.41 0.61 0.44 0.60 0.48 0.61
Number of observations 65 65 39 39 32 32 65 65 39 39 32 32
a006<0.80
Dependent variable is log ourput per worker Dependent variable is log GDP per capita
Full sample a006<0.90 a006<0.80 Full sample a006<0.90
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“(Question Wording): 
Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at 
home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please 
choose up to five. (CODE FIVE ONLY) 
A029 Independence 
A030 Hardwork 
A032 Feeling of Responsibility 
  A034 Imagination 
  A038 Thrift saving money and things 
  A039 Determination perseverance 
  A040 Religious faith 
  A041 Unselfishness 
  A042 Obedience” 
 
We use proportion of individuals selecting above mentioned questions. For 
instance, proportion of people choosing A042 is our variable “obedience” 
Further, we use trust question that is shown in section 4.2. The results are 
shown in table 4.3. It shows the impact of respect and added values. The 
first column shows the coefficient for the added cultural values. For instance, 
in the first row, we add independence in addition to latitude and respect. 
We find that independence has no significant effect on log output per worker, 
whereas latitude and respect are significant. As seen in the table, respect is 
highly significant and has positive sign in all cases. Even after controlling for 
variables for culture and latitude, we find a strong, robust link between 
respect for others and economic outcomes. Further, the same is observed 
when we use log GDP per capita as a dependent variable. 
  We also observe that responsibility plays an important role in economic 
outcomes and this is consistent with the results obtained in Breuer and 
Mcdermott (2013). Both respect and responsibility affect economic 
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outcomes. We also find negative association between obedience and 
economic outcomes. Moreover, we see that trust is insignificant when 
included with respect and latitude. By and large, the estimates are similar 
across all the specifications and we find that respect is positive and 
significant. 
 
 
Table 4. 3 OLS The impact of respect and added values 
 
Notes: robust Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; 
Dependent variable is log output per worker and log GDP per capita. Source: 
Penn World Table; Latitude is absolute value of the latitude of the country 
(distance from the equator). It ranges from 0 and 1 and 0 is the equator. 
Source: CIA Fact Book and La Porta et al. (1999); Added values and Respect 
are from WVS. See Appendix 4.1 for more details. 
 
 
 
 
 
Added Added Value Respect Latitude Added Value Respect Latitude
Independence 0.59 4.02*** 2.61*** 0.99** 4.13*** 2.69***
(0.47) (0.79) (0.53) (0.48) (0.81) (0.54)
Hardwork -1.00** 3.03*** 2.74*** -0.97* 3.20*** 2.94***
(0.49) (1.09) (0.51) (0.49) (1.08) (0.55)
Responsibility 2.16** 3.30*** 2.29*** 2.81*** 3.21*** 2.35***
(0.87) (0.84) (0.51) (0.85) (0.89) (0.53)
Imagination 0.18 4.03*** 2.74*** 0.96 4.07*** 2.80***
(0.89) (0.80) (0.56) (0.96) (0.85) (0.57)
Thrift -0.02 4.04*** 2.77*** 0.43 4.34*** 2.93***
(0.81) (0.86) (0.55) (0.83) (0.87) (0.58)
Preseverance 0.59 4.01*** 2.63*** 1.34* 4.09*** 2.65***
(0.68) (0.77) (0.61) (0.70) (0.79) (0.65)
Religious faith -0.49 4.07*** 2.39*** -1.17*** 4.22*** 2.06***
(0.32) (0.77) (0.61) (0.33) (0.76) (0.63)
Unselfishness -0.35 4.14*** 2.66*** -0.47 4.31*** 2.82***
(0.65) (0.79) (0.59) (0.74) (0.82) (0.64)
Obedience -1.71*** 4.82*** 1.53*** -2.38*** 5.26*** 1.24***
(0.52) (0.66) (0.39) (0.49) (0.65) (0.40)
Trust -0.25 4.15*** 2.87*** 0.21 4.22*** 2.85***
(0.46) (0.76) (0.59) (0.52) (0.80) (0.64)
Dependent : log output per worker Dependent : log GDP per capita
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It can be concluded from the OLS results that there is a strong positive 
relationship between respect for others and economic performance. A priori, 
it is possible to make causality discussion in both directions. Respect may 
affect economic outcomes positively. However, it may be the case that a 
wealthy country may promote more respect in the country. To tackle this 
problem, we use IV estimation. Tabellini (2010) uses IV estimation to 
estimate a causal effect of culture on economic outcomes. Further, there 
are many studies that estimate the impact of culture on economic outcomes 
by IV approach. The next section of the empirical analysis addresses 
concerns about endogeneity using IV estimation.  
 
 
4.4.2. IV Results 
 
In order to estimate the impact of culture on economic outcomes using IV 
approach, religion has been used as an instrument for culture in current 
literature. It is argued that religion affects economic outcomes only through 
culture. One explanation for this is that the purpose of religion is to shape 
people’s values. It seems that proportion of cultural traits affect peoples’ 
value. Human values are likely to be shaped by proportion of individuals who 
share similar thoughts. Therefore, we use value type as an instrument for 
culture (respect) instead of religion. Respect for others is instrumented 
using “the proportions of the populations in 1980 that are identified as 
Catholic or Protestant” and “Civil liberties index in 1972” in Breuer and 
Mcdermott (2013). We follow this strategy and use “the proportions of the 
populations that are identified as Value type 1” and “Civil liberties index 
in1990” as instruments for respect. Civil livery is used because the 
protection of civil liberties affects culture. 
Table 4.4 reports models in which respect is treated as endogenous and 
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the proportion of value type 1 and civil liberty index are used as instruments 
for respect. Dependent variable is log output per worker. 
  We follow Staiger and Stock (1997) and find that F-statistics for the first 
stage regressions comfortably exceed 10 in all the columns. Therefore, weak 
instruments are not a problem. We also investigate the validity of our 
approach by using overidentification tests shown in the table. In all the 
models, the overidentification tests do not reject the null hypothesis so that 
this is one support for our exclusion restriction. 
  In columns (1) and (2) of the table, we observe significant positive effect 
of respect on output per worker. Latitude is included in even columns64.  
As seen in the table, inclusion of latitude does not change the relationship 
between respect and economic outcomes. Columns (3)-(10) document the 
impact of culture for countries where the proportion of a religious person in 
a country is relatively low. The estimates show a significant impact of 
respect on log GDP per worker. However, coefficients for respect in columns 
(1) and (2) are larger than other columns. We find that respect determines 
economic development in those countries too. In Column (1), the effect of 
respect on log output per worker is 10.67 and this is highly significant and 
larger than that of the OLS estimates (5.69). Panel B of the table shows that 
the coefficients for respect in the IV estimations are larger than that in the 
corresponding OLS regressions. As a result, value type and civil liberty can 
be used as instruments for culture (respect) not only for the full sample but 
also for non-religious countries. Because it is somewhat difficult to justify 
that religion forms culture in some specific countries, our result here 
improves the robustness of the results in papers such as Breuer and 
Mcdermott (2013) that discuss the importance of respect using religion as an 
instrument for culture. In the next section, we see robustness checks for our 
                                                   
64 We follow Breuer and Mcdermott (2013) and AJR (2001) and included only latitude. As 
discussed in Mcdermott (2013), one of the reasons for using latitude is that latitude may 
be correlated with culture and lessens omitted variable bias. 
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main results. 
 
 
 
Table 4. 4 IV results for various samples 
 
Notes: robust Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; 
Dependent variable is log output per worker Source: Penn World Table; 
Latitude is absolute value of the latitude of the country (distance from the 
equator). It ranges from 0 and 1 and 0 is the equator. Source: CIA Fact Book 
and La Porta et al. (1999); Respect is from WVS. Civil liberty is from Freedom 
House. Panel A reports the two stage-least squares estimates with log output 
per worker as the dependent variable and Respect is instrumented using 
value type 1 and civil liberty. Panel B reports the coefficient from an OLS 
regression with log output per worker as the dependent variable and respect 
in each column as independent variables. Overidentification tests (p-value) 
reports the p-value for the overidentifying restriction tests that instruments 
are correctly excluded. See Appendix 4.1 for more details. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Respect 10.67*** 8.57*** 8.12*** 6.92*** 7.58*** 6.20*** 6.91*** 5.70*** 6.95*** 5.80***
(2.51) (2.74) (2.20) (1.37) (2.47) (1.79) (1.99) (2.18) (1.90) (2.23)
Latitude 1.60 1.32** 1.38** 1.47 1.41
(1.12) (0.58) (0.63) (0.99) (1.14)
Observations 65 65 46 46 39 39 34 34 32 32
First stage F-tests 17.32 10.40 17.41 14.61 12.04 12.09 15.38 12.03 13.63 11.45
Overidentification tests (p-value) [0.36] [0.65] [0.93] [0.78] [0.58] [0.31] [0.17] [0.14] [0.21] [0.22]
Respect 5.69*** 4.05*** 5.55*** 4.16*** 4.69*** 3.61*** 5.05*** 3.41*** 4.86*** 3.35***
(0.80) (0.76) (0.96) (0.87) (1.06) (0.94) (1.06) (1.06) (1.13) (1.07)
Latitude 2.77*** 2.25*** 2.08*** 2.53*** 2.49***
(0.54) (0.51) (0.56) (0.86) (0.89)
Panel B: Ordinary Least Squares
Full sample a006<0.95 a006<0.90 a006<0.85 a006<0.80
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares: Dependent variable is log output per worker
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4.5 Robustness 
 
 
4.5.1 Robustness Checks for Omitted Variables 
 
  Robustness of our approach relies on the assumption that the link 
between culture and economic outcomes is not driven by omitted variables. 
We are going to check whether the inclusion of variables affects our main 
results. Table 4.5 reports the effect of respect on economic outcomes when 
we control for a variety of additional variables.  
 Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) show that ethnic fragmentation affects 
economic outcomes negatively and Delhey and Newton (2005) document a 
negative relationship between ethnic diversity and trust. Therefore, we 
include ethnic fractionalization as an additional variable in our regressions. 
The use of ethnic fractionalization and legal origin65 is fairly common in the 
literature. 
  Columns (1)-(6) of table 4.5 report two stage-least squares estimates with 
log output per worker as the dependent variable. Our instruments for 
respect are civil liberty and proportion of individuals classified as value type 
1. F-statistics for the first stage regressions exceed 10 that is proposed by 
Staiger and Stock (1997). We also investigate the validity of our approach by 
using overidentification tests shown in the table. In all cases, the 
overidentification tests do not reject the null hypothesis so that this 
supports our exclusion restrictions. 
 In column (6), we include both French legal dummy and ethnic 
fractionalization. Many researcher report that ethnic fractionalization has 
negative impact on economic outcomes. This column finds a significant 
                                                   
65 We use French legal origin. The omitted group is the others 
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negative effect of ethnic fractionalization on economic output per worker. 
In columns (7)-(12), dependent variable is log GDP per capita. Coefficient 
on ethnic fractionalization is negative and significant in (7), (8), (11) and 
(12). The table shows that inclusion of these variables does not affect our 
main results. 
  In summary, inclusion of legal origin dummy and ethnic fractionalization 
has small impact on the estimated coefficient on respect, but its significance 
level is not influenced by them. The impact of respect on economic 
outcomes is robust to inclusion of these variables. 
 
Table 4. 5 Effect of respect on economic outcomes after using extended 
controls 
 
Notes: robust Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; 
Dependent variable in (1)-(6) is log output per worker; Dependent variable 
in (7)-(12) is log GDP per capita Source: Penn World Table; Latitude is 
absolute value of the latitude of the country (distance from the equator). It 
ranges from 0 and 1 and 0 is the equator. Source: CIA Fact Book and La Porta 
et al. (1999); Ethnic fractionalization ranges from 0 to 1. Source: Alesina et 
al. (2003); Respect is from WVS. Civil liberty is from Freedom House. Respect 
is instrumented using value type 1 and Civil liberty. Overidentification tests 
(p-value) reports the p-value for the overidentifying restriction tests that 
instruments are correctly excluded. See Appendix 4.1 for more details. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Respect 9.06*** 8.20*** 10.19*** 8.54*** 8.78*** 8.14*** 10.03*** 9.33*** 10.98*** 9.73*** 9.55*** 9.24***
(2.51) (2.29) (2.88) (3.01) (1.90) (1.63) (3.53) (3.46) (3.58) (2.91) (3.01) (2.84)
Latitutde 0.99 1.49 0.89 0.73 1.18 0.39
(0.76) (0.97) (0.84) (1.18) (1.08) (1.40)
Ethnic fractionalization -1.20** -0.86** -1.17*** -0.88* -1.31* -1.07* -1.25** -1.13**
(0.56) (0.42) (0.43) (0.53) (0.67) (0.55) (0.57) (0.53)
French legal origin -0.30 -0.11 -0.19 -0.10 -0.467* -0.34 -0.36 -0.32
(0.25) (0.25) (0.22) (0.26) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.23)
Observations 64 64 65 65 64 64 64 64 65 65 64 64
First stage F-tests 16.20 11.14 17.08 10.67 15.92 11.40 16.20 11.14 16.79 10.67 15.92 11.40
Overidentification tests (p-value) [0.79] [0.94] [0.46] [0.69] [0.97] [0.97] [0.18] [0.20] [0.15] [0.19] [0.26] [0.26]
Number of observations 65 65 39 39 32 32 65 65 39 39 32 32
R-squared 0.43 0.63 0.43 0.59 0.46 0.60 0.41 0.61 0.44 0.60 0.48 0.61
R-squared 65 65 39 39 32 32 65 65 39 39 32 32
Number of observations 0.43 0.63 0.43 0.59 0.46 0.60 0.41 0.61 0.44 0.60 0.48 0.61
Dependent variable is log ourput per worker Dependent variable is log GDP per capita
Full sample
137 
 
137 
 
In table 4.6, trust, ethnic fractionalization and legal origin dummy are 
included in our estimations. All specifications include latitude. Columns (1) 
and (2) report two stage-least squares estimates with log output per worker 
as the dependent variable. In columns (3) and (4), dependent variable is log 
GDP per capita. We find that respect has positive effect on both output per 
worker and GDP per capita.  
  As seen in the table, trust is insignificant for all columns. This implies that 
respect reduces the impact of trust. When we endogenize respect in columns 
2 and 4 and instrument for it using civil liberty index and value type, we also 
find that the effect of trust is not significant. Further, the coefficient on 
respect is larger than that of OLS estimate. Overall, inclusion of French legal 
origin, ethnic fractionalization and trust has small effect on our main results 
and respect remains to be positive and significant. 
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Table 4. 6 Effect of respect on economic outcomes after using extended 
controls 
 
Notes: robust Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; 
Dependent variable in (1) and (2) is log output per worker; Dependent 
variable in columns (3) and (4) is log GDP per capita Source: Penn World 
Table; Latitude is absolute value of the latitude of the country (distance 
from the equator). It ranges from 0 and 1 and 0 is the equator. Source: CIA 
Fact Book and La Porta et al. (1999); Ethnic fractionalization ranges from 0 
to 1. Source: Alesina et al. (2003); Respect is from WVS. Civil liberty is from 
Freedom House. Respect is instrumented using value type 1 and Civil liberty. 
Overidentification tests (p-value) reports the p-value for the overidentifying 
restriction tests that instruments are correctly excluded. See Appendix 4.1 
for more details. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV OLS IV
Respect 4.31*** 8.06*** 4.56*** 9.08***
(0.74) (2.98) (0.72) (3.45)
Latitutde 2.17*** 1.15 1.81** 0.59
(0.71) (1.14) (0.71) (1.34)
Ethnic fractionalization -0.86* -0.91 -1.01** -1.07*
(0.49) (0.58) (0.50) (0.63)
French legal origin -0.089 -0.20 -0.26 -0.40
(0.20) (0.27) (0.21) (0.24)
Trust -0.41 -0.72 -0.022 -0.39
(0.51) (1.22) (0.55) (1.24)
Observations 62 62 62 62
R-Squared 0.66 0.66
First stage F-tests 11.64 11.64
Overidentification tests (p-value) [0.64] [0.18]
Full sample
log ourput per worker log GDP per capita
139 
 
139 
 
4.5.2 Religious Faith 
 
 In this study, we exploit value type instead of religion because there are 
several advantages. One of them is that it enables us to check robustness of 
the impact of culture on economic outcomes for countries where the 
proportion of a religious person in a country is relatively low. Main results 
show that respect has positive impact on economic outcomes not only for 
full sample but also for non-religious countries. This section checks the 
robustness of this result. Section 4.3 classifies countries using proportion of 
respondents who answer that religion is important in question a006 
“Important in life: Religion” from WVS. 
This section, instead, uses a040 “Religious faith” (see section 4.4) to 
classify countries into two groups-religious country and non-religious country. 
We select countries using proportion of individuals selecting “religious faith”. 
As our strategy enables us to estimate the impact of culture on economic 
performance in non-religious countries, this section focuses on countries 
with low religious faith (a40). In table 4.5.2, we perform IV estimation for 
three different samples. Although F-statistic is small in some columns, we 
observe the positive impact of respect on economic outcomes for countries 
where religious faith is not recognized as important quality for children to 
learn at home. 
The set of results from table 4.7 finds a positive impact of respect on 
economic outcomes and the results presented here support our main findings. 
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Table 4. 7  IV-Religious faith 
 
Notes: robust Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; 
Dependent variable is log output per worker Source: Penn World Table; 
Latitude is absolute value of the latitude of the country (distance from the 
equator). It ranges from 0 and 1 and 0 is the equator. Source: CIA Fact Book 
and La Porta et al. (1999); Respect is from WVS. Civil liberty is from Freedom 
House. This table reports the two stage-least squares estimates with log 
output per worker as a dependent variable and Respect is instrumented using 
value type 1 and Civil liberty. Overidentification tests (p-value) reports the 
p-value for the overidentifying restriction tests that instruments are 
correctly excluded. In columns (3) and (4), we used countries where less 
than 40 percent of people selecting religious faith in a040. In columns (5) 
and (6), we used countries where less than 35 percent of people consider 
religious faith to be especially important. Source: WVS. See Appendix 4.1 for 
more details.  
 
 
 
4.5.3 Robustness to the Elimination of Regions 
  
 This section investigates whether our results are obtained by some 
particular region of the world. This is common strategy in empirical studies. 
This section drops one geographical region at a time from the regression 
sample. Further, we use samples that have more than 45 observations. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Respect 10.67*** 8.57*** 7.07*** 5.23*** 5.23*** 4.70**
(2.51) (2.74) (2.43) (1.75) (1.97) (2.05)
Latitude 1.60 1.94* 0.79
(1.12) (1.12) (1.00)
Observations 65 65 31 31 28 28
First stage F-tests 17.32 10.40 9.57 8.18 14.23 9.95
Overidentification tests (p-value) [0.36] [0.65] [0.49] [0.47] [0.12] [0.13]
Full sample a040<0.40 a006<0.35
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares: Dependent variable is log GDP per worker
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Therefore, the world regions that we consider for one-at-a-time elimination 
from the full estimation sample include SubSaharan Africa (SSA), East Asia 
and Pacific (EAP), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), North America, 
and South Asia. The Appendix-Table 4.6 reveals that the key findings from 
our analysis are robust to dropping the above-mentioned regions one at a 
time. 
 
 
 
4.6 Concluding Remarks for Chapter 4 
 
 
  This section is motivated by interesting studies that assert impact of 
culture on economic performance. Recent papers document that 
“tolerance and respect for other people (respect)” plays an important role 
in economic outcomes. It is has been pointed out by many researchers that 
causality between culture and economic outcomes can be in both 
directions. This leads to the use of IV estimation. In order to instrument 
culture, historical variables and religion are widely used. We follow this 
strategy but, we use the proportion of the population classified as value 
type 1 instead of the proportion of the population with religious faith 
identified as Catholic or Protestant. There are several merits of using value 
type as an instrument for respect. One of them is that there are many 
countries where people living there are not very religious. The use of 
religion as one of the instruments implicitly assumes that religion affects 
beliefs and culture. Therefore, our strategy enables us to check the 
robustness of previous studies. Our main results show that respect for 
others positively affects economic outcomes. Further, the concern of the 
existence of non- religious country is untangled. In addition to the above-
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mentioned merits, our instruments do not include historical variable. 
Historical variables may have an impact on past economic performance 
through past culture. Further, as stated in chapter 3, past economic 
performance tend to persist to the present. Therefore, the strategy of 
using historical variables as instruments for current culture is somewhat 
unconvincing. As this chapter does not use historical variables and religion, 
it makes  
The results obtained here are consistent with the result of current 
literature. We see the positive impact of respect on economic outcomes 
not only for full sample but also for non-religious countries. Further, 
inclusion of candidates for omitted variables such as “Trust”, 
“Independence”, “Hard work”, “Feeling of Responsibility”, “Imagination”, 
“Thrift saving money and things”, “Determination perseverance”, 
“Religious faith”, “Unselfishness”, and “Obedience” has only little impact 
on our main result. This chapter further reports that the results are robust 
to inclusion of variables such as legal origin, ethnic fractionalization, and 
trust. Again, we find robust effect of respect for others on economic 
performance. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
 
Appendix 4.1 Data and Cultural Values 
 
 
143 
 
143 
 
Data Description and Sources 
 
GDP per capita: Source: Penn World Table 7.0 
Output per worker: Source: Penn World Table 7.0 
Latitude: Absolute value of the latitude of the country (distance from the 
equator). It ranges from 0 and 1 and 0 is the equator. Source: CIA Fact Book 
and La Porta et al. (1999) 
A006 (Important in life: Religion): Proportion of individuals selecting 
religion is “ 1 Very important” or “ 2 Rather important” in Question a006 
Source: the WVS 
A040 (Religious Faith): Proportion of individuals selecting religion is 
“Religious Faith” in Question a040 Source: the WVS 
Trust: Proportion of individuals selecting “most people can be trusted” in 
Question a165 Source: the WVS 
Responsibility: Proportion of individuals selecting “Resposibility” in 
Question a032 Source: the WVS. See Appendix 4.1 for details 
Respect: Proportion of individuals selecting “Respect” in Question a035. 
Source: the WVS. See Appendix 4.1 for details 
Other cultural values (a029: independence, a030: hard work, a034: 
imagination, a038: thrift, a039: perseverance, a040: religious faith, a041: 
unselfishness, a042: obedience): Proportion of individuals selecting each 
quality. Source: the WVS. 
Civil Liberty: Index of Civil Liberties in 1990. Because of missing values, we 
used Civil liberties in 1991 for some countries such as Russia. It ranges from 
1 to 7 and we reversed this scale so that larger numbers indicate a higher 
degree of freedom .Source: Freedom House  
Legal origin dummies: Legal origin of the company law or commercial code 
of each country. We use French legal dummy. Source: La Porta et al. (1999) 
Ethnic Fractionalization: Ethnic fractionalization index of each country 
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constructed by Alesina et al. (2003). It captures the probability that two 
individuals, selected at random from a country’s population, will belong to 
different ethnic groups. Source: Alesina et al. (2003) 
 
 
 
Ten Items for Schwartz’s Dimensions 
 
  
Source: World Values Surveys; Wave 5 (2005-2009) and Wave 6 (2010-
2014).  
Question wording: Now I will briefly describe some people. Using this card, 
would you please indicate for each description whether that person is very 
much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all like 
you? (Code one answer for each description): 
A189 (Schwartz: It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be 
creative) 
It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be creative; to 
do things one’s own way. 
A190 (Schwartz: It is important to this person to be rich) 
It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money and 
expensive things. 
A191 (Schwartz: It is important to this person living in secure surroundings) 
Living in secure surroundings is important to this person; to avoid 
anything that might be dangerous. 
A192 (Schwartz: It is important to this person to have a good time) 
It is important to this person to have a good time; to “spoil” oneself. 
A193 (Schwartz: It is important to this person to help the people nearby) 
It is important to this person to help the people nearby; to care for their 
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well-being. 
A194 (Schwartz: It is important to this person being very successful) 
Being very successful is important to this person; to have people 
recognize one’s achievements. 
A195 (Schwartz: It is important to this person adventure and taking risks) 
Adventure and taking risks are important to this person; to have an 
exciting life. 
A196 (Schwartz: It is important to this person to always behave properly) 
  It is important to this person to always behave properly; to avoid doing 
anything people would say is wrong. 
A197 (Schwartz: It is important to this person looking after the environment) 
  Looking after the environment is important to this person; to care for 
nature. 
A198 (Schwartz: It is important to this person tradition) 
  Tradition is important to this person; to follow the customs handed down 
by one’s religion or family. 
 
Respondents answer the above questions from the following 
1 Very much like me 
2 Like me 
3 Somewhat like me 
4 A little like me 
5 Not like me 
6 Not at all like me 
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Cultural Values- Ten Values used in the Analysis 
 
Question wording: Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged 
to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? 
Please choose up to five. (CODE FIVE ONLY) 
 
A029 Independence 
A030 Hard work 
A032 Feeling of Responsibility 
  A034 Imagination 
  A035 Respect for others 
  A038 Thrift saving money and things 
  A039 Determination perseverance 
  A040 Religious faith 
  A041 Unselfishness 
  A042 Obedience 
 
A 165 (Trust) Question wording: 
 “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you need to be very careful in dealing with people? 
1 Most people can be trusted, 2 need to be very careful. 
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Appendix 4.2 
Appendix-Table 4. 1 (wave 5) (Schwartz) Distribution of the population of 
the countries in wave 3 among value types, % 
 
 
Country Value type 1 Value type 2 Value type 3
Argentina 17.45 43.84 38.71
Australia 16.43 32.43 51.14
Brazil 24.74 58.21 17.04
Bulgaria 24.80 39.61 35.59
Burkina Faso 54.38 28.77 16.86
Canada 29.30 37.82 32.89
Chile 41.52 32.61 25.87
China 26.25 43.49 30.26
Cyprus 47.09 34.01 18.90
Egypt 44.61 48.87 6.52
Ethiopia 51.36 11.53 37.11
Finland 17.17 35.76 47.07
France 25.28 31.79 42.93
Georgia 34.99 58.90 6.11
Germany 18.75 28.53 52.72
Ghana 78.91 15.02 6.08
Great Britain 25.30 40.04 34.66
Hungary 40.16 36.71 23.12
India 56.01 20.02 23.97
Indonesia 44.74 38.24 17.02
Japan 2.69 13.10 84.21
Jordan 89.74 6.43 3.83
Malaysia 35.09 23.98 40.94
Mali 64.75 27.32 7.92
Mexico 33.91 40.12 25.97
Moldova 30.54 38.73 30.74
Morocco 54.07 27.13 18.80
Netherlands 16.54 18.58 64.88
Norway 14.02 34.35 51.63
Peru 22.58 39.16 38.27
Poland 33.81 46.08 20.10
Romania 31.51 40.62 27.87
Russia 24.62 37.63 37.75
Rwanda 52.14 28.79 19.07
Slovenia 33.13 40.06 26.81
South Africa 70.50 17.30 12.20
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Notes: People in value type 1 tend to disagree with 1 (self-direction) and 2 
(power); Individuals in value type 2 tend to disagree with 7 (stimulation); 
People in value type 3 tend to disagree with 10 (Tradition) 
 
Appendix-Table 4. 2 (wave 6) (Schwartz) Distribution of the population of 
the countries in wave 3 among value types, % 
 
Notes: People in value type 1 tend to disagree with 1 (self-direction) and 
South Korea 26.11 13.51 60.38
Spain 34.06 35.63 30.31
Sweden 19.00 29.98 51.02
Switzerland 16.74 31.66 51.61
Thailand 29.65 17.42 52.93
Trinidad and Tobago 35.51 44.69 19.80
Turkey 57.05 28.84 14.11
Ukraine 24.65 37.62 37.74
United States 18.63 32.43 48.94
Uruguay 19.14 38.91 41.95
Viet Nam 46.88 28.20 24.92
Zambia 54.71 18.24 27.06
Country Value type 1 Value type 2 Value type 3
Country Value type 1 Value type 2 Value type 3
Algeria 61.70 20.79 17.50
China 26.25 28.83 44.91
Colombia 48.92 39.38 11.69
Ecuador 62.47 17.76 19.77
Egypt 51.28 33.29 15.43
Germany 24.35 23.74 51.91
Iraq 65.22 22.39 12.39
Jordan 70.08 21.27 8.64
Lebanon 60.37 12.35 27.28
Libya 61.45 29.11 9.45
Morocco 28.03 46.50 25.48
Netherlands 5.02 20.72 74.26
Pakistan 68.00 5.61 26.38
Rwanda 38.38 12.64 48.98
Spain 38.51 32.11 29.39
Tunisia 62.67 24.38 12.96
Yemen 43.08 42.95 13.98
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2 (power); Individuals in value type 2 tend to disagree with 7 (stimulation); 
People in value type 3 tend to disagree with 10 (Tradition) 
 
Appendix-Table 4. 3 Data Summary for key variables when a<0.80 
 
Notes: Log output per worker and Log GDP per capita Source: Penn World 
Table; Latitude Source La porta et al. (1999); Respect and Trust Source: WVS; 
Value type 1 Proportion of people classified as value type 1. People in value 
type 1 inclined to disagree with 1 (self-direction) and 2 (power) 
 
Appendix-Table 4. 4 IV results for various samples-dependent variable is log 
GDP per capita 
 
Notes: robust Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; 
Dependent variable is log output per worker Source: Penn World Table; 
Latitude is absolute value of the latitude of the country (distance from the 
equator). It ranges from 0 and 1 and 0 is the equator. Source: CIA Fact Book 
and La Porta et al. (1999); Respect is from WVS. Civil liberty is from Freedom 
House. Panel A reports the two stage-least squares estimates with log output 
per capita as the dependent variable and Respect is instrumented using 
value type 1 and Civil liberty. Panel B reports the coefficient from an OLS 
regression with log output per worker as the dependent variable and Respect 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log output per worker 32 10.42 0.97 7.64 11.47
Log GDP per capita 32 9.72 0.98 6.93 10.83
Latitude 32 0.47 0.16 0.02 0.71
Respect 32 0.73 0.13 0.47 0.94
Trust 32 0.35 0.19 0.06 0.74
Value type 1 32 0.26 0.12 0.03 0.60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Respect 11.67*** 9.80*** 8.45*** 7.31** 7.78** 6.46** 7.12*** 5.95** 7.08** 5.99**
(3.36) (3.54) (2.57) (2.93) (3.10) (3.09) (2.48) (2.41) (3.10) (2.51)
Latitude 1.48 1.27 1.41 1.47 1.39
(0.93) (0.88) (0.97) (0.99) (1.25)
Observations 65 65 46 46 39 39 34 34 32 32
First stage F-tests 16.70 10.37 13.59 12.25 9.30 10.12 11.69 9.75 10.40 9.27
Overidentification tests (p-value) [0.12] [0.17] [0.82] [0.84] [0.66] [0.45] [0.28] [0.26] [0.28] [0.29]
Respect 5.94*** 4.19*** 5.72*** 4.30*** 4.91*** 3.80*** 5.31*** 3.68*** 5.07*** 3.59***
(0.81) (0.78) (0.92) (0.83) (0.99) (0.87) (0.98) (0.98) (1.02) (0.98)
Latitude 2.96*** 2.28*** 2.13*** 2.52*** 2.45**
(0.57) (0.53) (0.57) (0.85) (0.89)
Panel B: Ordinary Least Squares
Full sample a006<0.95 a006<0.90 a006<0.85 a006<0.80
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares: Dependent variable is log GDP per capita
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in each column as independent variables. Overidentification tests (p-value) 
reports the p-value for the overidentifying restriction tests that instruments 
are correctly excluded. See Appendix 4.1 for more details. See Appendix 4.1 
for more details. 
 
 
Appendix-Table 4. 5 Sample of Countries 
 
Notes: Waves are written in parentheses for countries that have 2 
observations. a006 shows the proportion of individuals selecting religion is 
important or rather important in a country. Therefore, we call countries with 
low a006 as non-religious countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a006<0.80 Argentina Australia Bulgaria Canada Chile
China (5) China (6) Finland France Germany
Germany Great Britain Hungary Japan Lebanon
Moldova Netherlands (5) Netherlands (6) Norway Peru
Russia Rwanda Slovenia South Korea Spain (5)
Spain (6) Sweden Switzerland Ukraine United States
Uruguay Viet Nam
0.80≤a006<0.85 Cyprus India
0.85≤a006<0.90 Colombia Ecuador Mexico Poland Trinidad and Tobago
0.90≤a006<0.95 Brazil Ethiopia Romania South Africa Thailand
Turkey Zambia
0.95≤a006 Algeria Burkina Faso Egypt (5) Egypt (6) Georgia
Ghana Indonesia Iraq Jordan (5) Jordan (6)
Libya Malaysia Mali Morocco (6) Morocco (6)
Pakistan Rwanda Tunisia Yemen
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Appendix-Table 4. 6 IV results- dropping one geographical region at a time 
from the regression sample 
 
Notes: LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean; SSA:SubSaharan Africa; 
EAP:East Asia and Pacific. Robust standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Dependent variable is log output per worker Source: Penn 
World Table; Respect is from WVS. Civil liberty is from Freedom House. This 
table reports the two stage-least squares estimates with log output per 
worker as a dependent variable and Respect is instrumented using value type 
1 and Civil liberty. Overidentification tests (p-value) reports the p-value for 
the overidentifying restriction tests that instruments are correctly excluded. 
In column (1), LAC is excluded from our sample. In column (2), SSA is 
excluded. EAP is eliminated from the sample in column (3). In column(4), 
North America is excluded and South Asia is eliminated in column (5). See 
Appendix 4.1 for more details.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix-Figure 4. 1 Early culture, early economic performance and current 
economic performance 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Respect 10.91*** 8.15*** 11.15*** 10.53*** 10.51***
(3.32) (2.7) (3.99) (3.21) (3.07)
Observations 56 57 56 63 63
First stage F-tests 15.59 9.99 12.37 15.79 18.28
Overidentification tests (p-value) [0.43] [0.80] [0.94] [0.37] [0.24]
Omitted Region LAC SSA EAP North America South Asia
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares: Dependent variable is log output per worker
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Concluding Remarks 
 
 
  This thesis set out to investigate the role of cultural diversity based on 
human values (value diversity). Value diversity measure is different from 
prevailing measures of cultural diversity in the sense that it captures 
heterogeneity in internal traits. This study found several merits of 
introducing our measure. We also focused on the proportion of the people 
who share similar values (value type). We constructed value type and value 
diversity (value fractionalization and value polarization) and casted light on 
the use of them by the study of the role of formal and informal institutions. 
Chapter 1 discussed motivation and background behind the thesis. 
Contributions to the current literature were also outlined in this chapter. 
Chapter 2 argued the weaknesses of commonly used measure of cultural 
diversity and we proposed value diversity measures using data from the 
World Values Survey. We first discussed the advantage and disadvantage of 
cultural diversity and using interesting examples to demonstrate that value 
diversity measure captures perspectives that is different from prevailing 
cultural diversity measures. In next two chapters the usefulness of our 
indices for questions of economic development is demonstrated. 
   The third and fourth chapters investigated correspondingly the impact of 
formal and informal institutions on economic performance using the indices 
constructed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 revisited the existing theory by 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) and sought alternative ways of estimating the impact 
of formal institutions (Rule of law) on economic performance. Instead of 
using historical variables as an instrument for institutions, we exploited 
value fractionalization as an instrument to disentangle the impact of current 
institutions on economic performance. The use of value fractionalization 
made it possible to mitigate some concerns in previous studies such as poor 
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quality of historical dataset and the link that historical variables may affect 
current economic performance not only through institutional development 
but also through past economic performance. In addition to several new 
findings, the results showed that the quality of institution plays an important 
role in economic development.  
 Chapter 4 on the other hand focused on the role of informal institutions 
(respect for others) in economic outcomes. This thesis adopted fraction of 
individuals who share similar values as instruments for respect in the IV 
estimation. Recent papers use religion as one of the instruments for culture. 
This is because the purpose of religion is to shape people’s values. However, 
the assumption that religion affects culture is somewhat unconvincing for 
non-religious countries. Therefore, our approach enabled us to see the 
impact of respect on economic outcomes alleviating the concerns of the 
existence of non-religious countries. This chapter extended our knowledge 
of the impact of respect for others without using commonly used 
instruments- historical variables and religion. 
One of the limitations with our study is that our data heavily depends on 
WVS. Future research might examine whether these results can be 
replicated using data other than from WVS. Although a large battery of 
checks has been done to provide evidence of causal relationship between 
institutions and economic performance, it is difficult to rule out omitted 
factors completely. Further, the study would have been more interesting if 
it had included more countries. Especially, Schwartz items are not included 
in wave 1 to wave 4 of WVS so that we have only 65 observations in chapter 
4.  
Despite these limitations, this thesis is the first to construct diversity 
measures based on human values that lead to interesting results regarding 
economic development. 
